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Out of the Daubert Fire and into the Fryeing Pan? 
Self­Validation, Meta­Expertise and the 
Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye 
Jurisdictions
Simon A. Cole*
Increasingly,  in  contemporary  society,  regulators, 
judges,  and  others  charged  with  technical  decision-
making are compelled to wrestle with the problem of how 
to evaluate claims to expertise.1 Who should count as an 
expert, and whose voice should be heard when technical 
decisions must be made? Over the past several decades, 
it has become clear that there is no easy answer to this 
problem. We cannot simply adhere to crude credentialism
—attributing expertise to those with advanced degrees in 
the  appropriate  areas—in  part,  because  all  sorts  of  lay 
persons—from  AIDS  patients  to  sheep  farmers—have 
shown that they can acquire and deploy expert knowledge 
over even highly technical domains.2 Indeed, it has been 
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shown that the attribution of expertise itself can be viewed 
as sort of strategic, adversarial “game.”3 At the same time, 
we surely cannot attribute equal expertise to everyone who 
claims to be an expert.4 At some point, technical decision 
makers  must  face  the  awkward  task  of  adjudicating 
expertise—of legitimating some claims to expert knowledge 
and  delegitimating  others.  But  surely  we  want  such 
adjudications to be more than arbitrary;  surely,  we need 
some  sort  of  rational  framework  for  making  such 
determinations.
Among  the  technical  decision-makers  who  must 
adjudicate  claims  to  expertise  are  trial  judges.  In  most 
American  jurisdictions,  trial  judges  are  charged  with  the 
task  of  “gatekeeping,”  of  legitimating  some  claims  to 
expertise—by allowing the expert to testify at a trial—and 
delegitimating  others—by  barring  the  expert  from 
testifying. Most American jurisdictions adhere to one of two 
general  approaches  to  determining  the  admissibility  of 
expert evidence. The first, which Professor Allen has called 
“The Deference Model,” holds that trial courts should defer 
to an expert community to determine whether a proffered 
evidentiary  claim  is  held  in  high  esteem,  or  “generally 
accepted.”5 Professor  Brewer  has  usefully  called  this 
process “practical epistemic deference.”6 This approach is 
embodied  by  the  1923  D.C.  Circuit  case  Frye  v.  United 
States  and  by  many  state  cases  adopting,  and  in  some 
cases elaborating  on,  Frye.7 The second approach,  which 
has  most  usefully  been  termed  the  “reliability-validity 
standard,” directs trial judges to undertake an independent 
assessment of the relevance and reliability of a proffered 
evidentiary claim.8 This approach is embodied by the 1993 
EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996).
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Process,  107 Yale L. J. 1535, 1567 (1998) (“the process of deference by 
legal reasoners to experts”).
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United  State  Supreme  Court  decision  Daubert  v.  Merrell 
Dow  Pharmaceuticals and  its  progeny  cases,  General 
Electric v. Joiner and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.9
Frye  was heavily  criticized  in  its  time.10 Daubert  has 
generated extensive commentary,  too large and varied a 
literature to summarize here, and some scholars have even 
advocated a return to the deferential  approach of  Frye.11 
This paper takes no position on the debate between  Frye 
and Daubert.  It does, however, seek to draw our attention 
back to the deferential approach by further exploring some 
of the problems in the application of  Frye,  problems that 
scholars have tended to neglect in the last decade and a 
half,  as  attention  has  shifted  to  the  reliability-validity 
approach.
The  great  advantage  of  the  deference  approach  has 
been its reliance of the collective wisdom of an institution 
that commands great epistemic prestige in contemporary 
society:  what  is  described  in  Frye  as  the  “scientific 
community.” The approach is broadly consistent with much 
of  contemporary  society’s  approach  to  technical  decision 
making: Want to know whether nuclear power plants are 
safe,  whether  tobacco  causes  cancer,  whether  human-
induced climate change is occurring? Ask an expert. To the 
extent  that  most  of  us  prefer  to  defer  to  experts  about 
important,  highly  technical  decisions,  Frye  models  this 
process, rather than, as  Daubert  does, turning judges into 
“amateur scientists,” much as making one’s own medical 
decisions turns  the  layperson  into  an  amateur  physician. 
Essentially, Frye seeks to replicate the ideal of peer review 
in  which  the  consensus  judgment  of  the  scientific 
community should be considered the best, if not the “true,” 
answer  to  scientific  and  technical  questions.  As  one 
evidence scholar noted, “the ‘real’  issue is whether good 
9
9
. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993); 
General  Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1997);  Kumho Tire v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
10
1
. Paul C. Giannelli,  The Admissibility of Novel  Scientific Evidence: 
Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
11 . Adina Schwartz,  A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. 
Merrell  Dow  Pharmaceuticals,  Inc.  and  the  Need  to  Resurrect  the 
Philosophical Insight of  Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 149 
(1997).
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scientists consider the evidence reliable at this time.”12
But how should the deference model function when the 
expert  community  from  which  the  proffered  expert 
emanates  is  not  part  of  what  would  commonly  be 
recognized as the scientific community? Frye has famously 
been  criticized  for  purportedly  allowing  astrologers  to 
testify based on the “general acceptance” of their claims 
within  the  community  of  astrologers.13 In  reality,  courts 
have  dealt  with  such  problems  by  identifying  what  we 
might  call  an  appropriate reference  community, a 
community  that  is  commonly  recognized  as  “scientific” 
whom the  contested  experts  must  convince  in  order  for 
their  claims  to  be  deemed  “generally  accepted.”  For 
example, in the  Frye  case itself proponents of the systolic 
blood  pressure  test  had  to  convince  psychologists  and 
physiologists that the test was valid. Acceptance within the 
community of operators of the test was insufficient.
But what is to be done when the choice of appropriate 
reference community is not seemingly self-evident,14 as the 
psychological community was for the lie detector? What, for 
example,  is  the  appropriate  reference  community  for 
astrologers?  One  might  say  astronomers,  but,  in  fact, 
professional astronomers spend very little time evaluating 
the validity of astrologers’ knowledge claims. Instead, the 
claimed  validity  of  astrology  has  been  evaluated  by  an 
eclectic group of individuals from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives—psychology, statistics, astronomy—who have 
undertaken  to  rigorously  empirically  evaluate  the  claims 
made by astrologers.15 In those cases in which courts must 
evaluate  the  validity  of  claims  for  which  the  appropriate 
reference  community  is  not  obvious,  courts  have  little 
alternative  but  to  similarly  turn  to  those  individuals  who 
12
1
. Paul  S.  Milich,  Controversial  Science in the Courtroom:  Daubert 
and the Law’s Hubris, 43 EMORY L. J. 913, 924 (1994);  see also, Schwartz, 
supra note 11, at 196.
13 . Michael  Saks,  Merlin  and  Solomon:  Lessons  from  the  Law’s 
Formative Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 
1069, 1138 (1998).
14 . I  say “seemingly self-evident” because, of course, the choice of 
psychologists and physiologists as the “relevant scientific communities” 
could have been contested.  See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE, 
252 (2004).
15 . For a review,  see Guide to Sources, http://www.rudolfhsmit.nl/u-
guid1.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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have endeavored to evaluate the validity of those claims 
from  some  rational,  empirical  standpoint.  We  might  call 
these individuals, who evaluate the validity of claims made 
by other experts, “meta-experts.”
Latent print (or “fingerprint”) identification, this article 
will suggest, is one of those cases for which the only way to 
find an expert evaluation of the proffered experts’ claims is 
to  turn  to  meta-experts.  Since  the  first  admissibility 
challenge to latent print testimony under Daubert in 1999, 
the  admissibility  of  latent  print  evidence  has  generated 
several  legal  opinions  and  a  fair  amount  of  legal 
scholarship.16 Courts have nearly unanimously found latent 
print  evidence  admissible.  Legal  scholars  have,  with  an 
equal degree of unanimity, found that latent print evidence 
fails to satisfy any reasonable application of  Daubert  and 
Kumho  Tire.17 These  discussions,  however,  have 
overwhelmingly  been  oriented  around  the  Daubert 
reliability-validity  approach.  There  have  been  almost  no 
legal  opinions,  and  no  scholarship,  assessing  the 
admissibility  of  latent  print  evidence  under  the  Frye 
deference  approach.  This  appears  to  be  because  of  the 
widespread  assumption  that,  whereas  latent  print 
individualization  evidence’s  ability  to  satisfy  Daubert’s 
“reliability” requirement may be in question, its ability to 
satisfy  Frye’s  “general  acceptance”  requirement  is  not. 
Scholars,  litigators,  and  judges  appear  to  have  assumed 
that the  Frye  general acceptance standard is satisfied by 
the  widespread  acceptance  of  the  technique  by  its 
numerous practitioners.   Some litigators  and judges may 
have also been assumed that latent print evidence would 
evade  Frye  analysis  because  it  is  not  novel  evidence  or 
because it is not scientific evidence.
All  of  these  assumptions are  false.This  article  argues 
that, in fact, latent print individualization evidence satisfies 
neither  Daubert  nor  Frye.  Moreover,  it  suggests  that, 
contrary to a common assumption among both lawyers and 
legal  scholars,  defendants  have  equally  strong,  if  not 
stronger, arguments for exclusion of latent print evidence 
16
1
. See sources cited infra note 241.
17 . Jennifer  L.  Mnookin,  The  Validity  of  Latent  Fingerprint 
Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & 
RISK 127 (2008).
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under  Frye  as under  Daubert.  Thus, latent print evidence 
may have escaped the  Daubert  fire, only to end up in the 
Fryeing pan.18
This  article  has  several  purposes.  First,  it  outlines  a 
conceptual  basis  for  challenging  latent  print  evidence  in 
jurisdictions adhering to Frye-like deference approaches to 
the admissibility of expert evidence. These include some of 
the largest jurisdictions in the United States.19 In so doing, 
the  article  will  further  explicate  some  of  the  conceptual 
difficulties  that  have  long  been  associated  with  the 
deference  approach,  especially  how  to  constitute  the 
“relevant  scientific  community”  and  how  to  measure 
“general  acceptance.”20 In  addition,  it  addresses  hitherto 
underexplored  conceptual  issues  raised  by  the  unusual 
situation  posed  by  latent  print  evidence:  a  non-scientific 
expert community offering testimony about what purports 
to  be  scientific  evidence  without  an  obvious  scientific 
community  to  which  a  fact-finder  can  refer  for  an 
assessment  of  the  validity  of  this  testimony.  The  article 
proposes the notion of the meta-expert to describe the ad 
hoc reference community that must be constituted in such 
a  case.  In  so  doing,  the  article  aims  to  enhance  our 
understanding of the deference approach to admissibility, 
an  approach  that  is  currently  understudied  and 
overshadowed  by  the  reliability-validity  approach.21 More 
broadly, the issue of how to adjudicate competing claims to 
expertise—how to decide who properly counts as an expert
—is currently an issue of great interest and great import in 
many areas outside of law, concerning technical decision-
making of all kinds.22 It is hoped that this discussion—f one 
peculiar  legal  problem  of  adjudicating  expertise—can 
contribute to that broader discussion as well.  Finally,  the 
18
1
. I am not the first to make this pun.  See  John F. Decker & Joel 
Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence—Out of the Frye Pan and Into 
Admissibility, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 314 (1977); Deborah Maliver, Note, Out of 
the Fryeing Pan and Into Daubert: Trial Judges at the Gate Will Not Spell  
Relief for Plaintiffs, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 245 (1994); David Bernstein, Note, 
Out of the Fryeing Pan and Into the Fire: The Expert Witness Problem in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117 (1990); Ned Miltenberg, Out of the 
Fire and into the Fryeing Pan Or Back to the Future, 37 TRIAL 18 (2001).
19 . See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
20
2
. Giannelli, supra, note 10.
21 . But see, Schwartz, supra note 11.
22 . See generally, COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 1.
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article  explores  some  of  the  larger  implications  of  the 
failure of latent print evidence under a deference approach. 
The  inability  of  latent  print  evidence  to  muster  “general 
acceptance” in the “relevant scientific community” not only 
poses  admissibility  challenges  in  both  deference  and 
reliability-validity  jurisdictions,  but  also  points  to  a larger 
issue of a fundamental split between the scientific and legal 
communities  over  the  necessity  of  validating  expert 
evidence.
In  Part  I  of  this  article,  I  discuss  the  background  to 
latent print admissibility challenges under Frye. In Part II, I 
explore  two  important  conceptual  issues  that  have  long 
troubled  the  application  of  Frye:  how  to  constitute  the 
“relevant  scientific  community”  and  how  to  measure 
“general acceptance.” In Part III, I undertake a Frye analysis 
of  latent  print  individualization  evidence,  whereby  I  find 
that latent print individualization is not generally accepted 
in the relevant scientific community.  In Part IV, I  explore 
some of the broader implications of this finding beyond the 
narrow issue of legal admissibility in Frye jurisdictions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE UNDER TWO ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS
The  admissibility  of  latent  print  individualization 
evidence has been extensively litigated over the past nine 
years. Most of this litigation has taken place in jurisdictions 
that adhere to what is colloquially known as “the  Daubert 
standard”  for  determining  the  admissibility  of  expert 
evidence. This is the admissibility standard that prevails in 
federal  court  and  is  articulated  by  the  Federal  Rules  of 
Evidence and the trilogy of Supreme Court cases: Daubert 
v.  Merrell  Dow  Pharmaceuticals,23 General  Electric  v. 
Joiner,24 and  Kumho  Tire  v.  Carmichael.25 The  Daubert 
trilogy holds that trial judges must ensure that all  expert 
evidence is both relevant and reliable.  It  further lays out 
five  discretionary26 criteria  to  assist  judges  in  assessing 
23
2
. 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993).
24 . 522 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1997).
25 . 526 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1999).
26 . See infra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
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reliability: testing, peer review and publication, standards, 
error rate, and general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community.27 In  addition  to  the  federal  courts,  at  least 
twenty-five  states  have  also  adopted  the  Daubert 
standard.28 With some qualified exceptions,  challenges to 
latent  print  evidence  under  the  Daubert  standard  have 
been unsuccessful.29
However, there is a second major standard governing 
the  admissibility  of  expert  evidence  in  American 
jurisdictions.  This  second standard,  colloquially  known as 
“the  Frye  rule,”  is  older  and derives from the 1923 D.C. 
Circuit case Frye v. United States.30 Frye posits a single test 
of  admissibility  of  scientific  evidence,  which  is  generally 
summarized  by  the  term  “general  acceptance.”  The 
relevant language from the Frye opinion is as follows:
Just  when  a  scientific  principle  or  discovery  crosses  the  line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way 
in  admitting  expert  testimony  deduced  from a  well-recognized 
scientific  principle  or  discovery,  the  thing  from  which  the 
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.31
A crucial distinction is that Frye, unlike Daubert, posits 
a  “deference  model”  for  evaluating  scientific  evidence.32 
Whereas  Daubert  asks  the  trial  court  itself  to  render  a 
judgment as to whether the proffered evidence is reliable, 
Frye  directs  the  court  to  defer  to  the  judgment  of  the 
“relevant  scientific  community.”  Frye,  as  Professor 
Schwartz  has  pointed  out,  assumes  that  scientists 
themselves  are  the  best  judges  of  scientific  claims.33 As 
such, a judge operating under  Frye is not being asked to 
form  an  independent  judgment  of  the  reliability  of  the 
technique. Instead, the judge is being asked to engage in a 
27
2
. Alice  B.  Lustre,  Post-Daubert Standards  for  Admissibility  of 
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, 
480 (2001).
28 . Id. at 454; see also infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
29 . See Part I. C. infra.
30
3
. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
31 . Id. at 1014.
32 . Allen, supra note 5.
33 . See 
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sort  of  scientometric34 exercise in  which she attempts  to 
measure the acceptance of the technique among scientists.
This  article  will  endeavor  to  model  the  conceptual 
process  of  a  Frye  inquiry  into  the admissibility  of  expert 
evidence by latent print examiners. The reader will be put 
in the position of a trial judge undertaking such an inquiry. 
Consistent with the philosophy of  the deference model,  I 
will  deliberately  refrain  from  explaining  the  nature  of 
fingerprint  evidence  and  the  scientific  objections  to  it. 
Strictly  speaking,  such  matters  should  be  outside  the 
purview of the trial court in a Frye jurisdiction. All the trial 
court  really  needs  to  know  is  whether  the  “relevant 
scientific community” accepts the proffered expert’s claim 
or  not.  Strictly  speaking,  the  judge  need  not  even 
understand why scientists hold the views they do, as long 
as  the  evidence  concerning  general  acceptance  is 
convincing. In this article, I attempt to compel the reader to 
adopt this  mode of  reasoning by deliberately  withholding 
technical explanations or objections to fingerprint evidence. 
There are numerous sources through which the interested 
reader may learn why scientists and scholars do not accept 
the claims of latent print examiners.35
34
3
. “Scientometrics,”  a  variant  of  bibliometrics,  is  a  field  which, 
among other things, seeks to measure the influence of particular scientific 
publications by the amount of citations.  See generally Helmut A. Abt, Do 
Important  Papers  Produce  High  Citation  Counts?,  48  SCIENTOMETRICS 65 
(2000).
35 . See generally 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2007) [hereinafter MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE];  Simon  A.  Cole,  Is  Fingerprint  Identification  Valid? 
Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28 LAW & POL’Y 
109 (2006) [hereinafter Cole,  Fingerprint Identification]; Robert Epstein, 
Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” is Revealed,  
75  SO.  CAL.  L.  REV.  605  (2002);  Lyn  Haber  &  Ralph  Haber,  Scientific 
Validation of Fingerprint Evidence under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY, & RISK 
87  (2008);  Tamara  F.  Lawson,  Can  Fingerprints  Lie?  Re-weighing 
Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal  Jury Trials,  31  AM.  J.  CRIM.  L.  1 (2003); 
Jennifer L. Mnookin,  Fingerprint Evidence In An Age of DNA Profiling,  67 
BROOK.  L.  REV.  13  (2001)  [hereinafter  Mnookin,  Fingerprint  Evidence]; 
Katherine  Schwinghammer,  Fingerprint  Identification:  How  “The  Gold 
Standard Of Evidence” Could Be Worth Its Weight,  32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 265 
(2005); Sandy L. Zabell,  Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143 (2005). 
For  defenses  of  latent  print  identification,  see CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET AL., 
FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN IMPRESSIONS (2004);  André  Moenssens, 
Fingerprint Identification: A Valid Reliable “Forensic  Science”?,  18  CRIM. 
JUST. 31 (2003).
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Although Daubert is generally perceived as the wave of 
the future, reports of Frye’s demise36 may be exaggerated. 
There are still  at least twelve states that adhere to some 
form of the Frye rule, and “Frye states” still include some of 
the nation’s largest jurisdictions (e.g., California, New York, 
Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania).37 Six additional states have 
incorporated  Daubert factors  but  continue  to  adhere  to 
Frye.38 Moreover, while many legal scholars have criticized 
Daubert,  some  have  gone  so  far  as  to  praise  the 
“philosophical  insight”  of  the  Frye rule  and called  for  its 
reinstatement in all jurisdictions.39
B. THE ASSUMPTION OF ADMISSIBILITY UNDER FRYE
When criminal defendants began litigating admissibility 
challenges to latent print evidence in 1999, it was widely 
assumed  that  such  challenges  were  only  possible  under 
Daubert. Daubert,  it  was  argued,  had  opened  a  door  to 
reconsideration of the admissibility of latent print evidence, 
a  door that  had been closed under  Frye.40 There were a 
number of reasons for this assumption, but in this article, I 
will argue that this assumption (an assumption I shared as 
well) may have been premature.
36
3
. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND  
RESEARCH ISSUES 7–10  (2002)  (noting  “[t]he  Decline  of  Frye”  and  citing 
“increasing” use of the Daubert standard, but acknowledging that  Frye 
“remains the standard by which science is evaluated for courtroom use in 
many  jurisdictions”).  See  also Richard  Friedman,  The  Death  and 
Transfiguration of Frye, 34 JURIMETRICS 133 (1994).
37 .
38 . In  addition  to  the  federal  courts,  the  Daubert  jurisdictions  are: 
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island,  South  Carolina,  South  Dakota, 
Tennessee,  Texas,  Vermont,  West  Virginia,  Wyoming.  The  Frye 
jurisdictions  are:  Arizona,  California,  the  District  of  Columbia,  Florida, 
Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington. States which combine  Frye  and  Daubert 
approaches  are:  Alabama,  Hawaii,  Massachusetts,  Nevada,  New 
Hampshire, and New Jersey. States with their own admissibility rules are: 
Georgia,  Utah,  Virginia,  and  Wisconsin.  States  that  have  a  split  of 
authority  supporting both  Frye  and  Daubert  approaches are:  Michigan, 
Mississippi, and Nebraska. Id.
39 .
40
4
. Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1098 (2003) (“such challenges would not have 
occurred under Frye.”).
SIMON A. COLE, "OUT OF THE DAUBERT FIRE AND INTO THE FRYEING PAN? SELF-VALIDATION, META-EXPERTISE AND 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE IN FRYE JURISDICTIONS," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453-542 
(2008).
2008] LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY 463
First,  Daubert  demands  that  expert  evidence 
demonstrate  not  only  relevance  but  also  reliability.  The 
demand for a demonstration of  reliability  was thought to 
pose  greater  difficulties  than  the  “general  acceptance” 
requirement  for  latent  print  individualization  evidence, 
especially  when  the  criminal  defense  bar  became  aware 
that  there  were  in  fact  no  studies  demonstrating  the 
reliability  of  latent  print  individualization.41 By  this  time, 
legal scholars had begun to note the apparent irony that 
Daubert, which had explicitly stated that it was intended to 
loosen  the  restrictions  on  expert  evidence,  in  fact, 
appeared to be a more stringent standard.42 Professor Saks 
argued that which standard was more exacting depended 
on the type of evidence.43 Some forms of evidence, such as 
very  cutting  edge  scientific  results,  might  have  high 
reliability but low general acceptance. Such evidence was 
more likely to be admitted under Daubert than Frye. Others 
enjoyed  high  general  acceptance,  but  had  little  or  no 
evidence  demonstrating  reliability.  Such  evidence  was 
more  likely  to  be  admitted  under  Frye  than  Daubert. 
Professor  Saks included latent print  evidence (along with 
much of the rest of the trace evidence forensic sciences)44 
in  this  category,  and his  analysis  no  doubt  did  much to 
inform  many  legal  actors’  assumptions  (including  mine) 
that  challenges  to  latent  print  individualization  evidence 
were unlikely to be successful in Frye jurisdictions.
Consistent with the Saksian view, most legal scholars 
believed  that  latent  print  individualization  evidence  had 
difficulties under four of the five Daubert reliability criteria. 
In most cases, however, an exception was made for general 
acceptance. Some legal scholars conceded that latent print 
evidence  probably  satisfied  the  general  acceptance 
criterion.45 Some  admissibility  challenges  to  latent  print 
evidence, in fact, conceded the general acceptance prong. 
41
4
.
42 . E.g., 
43 . Id.
44 . Trace evidence forensic sciences would include such disciplines as 
fingerprinting, tool mark identification, bite mark identification, forensic 
DNA profiling, microscopic hair and fiber comparison, forensic document 
examination, and footwear analysis.  Id. at 1094–1127.
45 . See generally    However, some attorneys have noted that latent 
print evidence enjoys acceptance only among practitioners. 
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Nevertheless, this concession was not thought to affect the 
overall admissibility of latent print evidence. First, proffered 
expert  evidence  that  met  only  one of  five  criteria  would 
seem to be a poor candidate for admissibility. Second, as 
the  Supreme  Court  noted  in  Kumho  Tire, general 
acceptance alone is usually insufficient to render evidence 
admissible “where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, 
for  example,  do  theories  grounded  in  any  so-called 
generally  accepted  principles  of  astrology  or 
necromancy.”46 This  reasoning  guided,  for  example,  the 
initial ruling (later vacated) in United States v. Llera Plaza, 
restricting the admissibility of latent print evidence.47
Most importantly,  it  has generally been assumed that 
an  analysis  of  the  state  of  general  acceptance  of  latent 
print  individualization  evidence  is  something  of  a  “no-
brainer.”48 The  “relevant  scientific  community”  is  latent 
print examiners. All latent print examiners “accept” latent 
print  evidence.  End  of  argument.  Many  courts  have 
concluded  that  latent  print  evidence  easily  satisfies  the 
general  acceptance  requirement,  even  when  evincing 
skepticism about  its  ability  to  satisfy  some of  the  other 
Daubert criteria.49 I  will  argue,  however,  that  this  is  an 
overly simplistic analysis within the meaning of Frye.
The final reason for assuming that  Frye  challenges to 
latent print evidence were not possible is a phrase in the 
Frye opinion that specifies that it applies to novel scientific 
evidence.50 This creates what some evidence scholars have 
called a non-novelty “loophole” in  Frye.51 Forms of expert 
evidence which either: (1) pre-date  Frye  altogether (as in 
46
4
. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
47 . United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza I), 179 F.  Supp. 2d 492, 
515 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“The 
failure of fingerprint identifications fully to satisfy the first three Daubert 
factors  militates  against  heavy  reliance  on  the  general  acceptance 
factor.”).
48 . United  States  v.  Gary,  85  F.  App’x.  908  (4th  Cir.  2004) 
(“[F]ingerprint  analysis  is  one  of  those  forms  of  evidence  where  the 
reliability of the science and its general acceptance is apparent without a 
full reexamination of the science.”).
49 . See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. 
Ky.  2003)  (“The  ACE-V  methodology  easily  satisfies  the  general 
acceptance factor of Daubert.”).
50
5
. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
51 . Giannelli, supra note 40, at 1099.
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the case of latent print individualization evidence), or (2) 
post-date Frye, but are not challenged until after they have 
become familiar enough to the criminal justice system to no 
longer be regarded as “novel,” would not be challengeable 
under Frye. Such forms of expert evidence would not even 
reach  the  general  acceptance  issue.  Because  Daubert 
explicitly  disavowed  any  novelty  requirement,52 it  was 
widely assumed that challenges were more possible under 
Daubert.53
For these reasons, the criminal defense bar and legal 
scholars alike have assumed that challenging latent print 
individualization evidence under  Frye  is a hopeless cause, 
while admissibility challenges under Daubert are, at least in 
principle,  plausible.  Litigants  wishing  to  challenge  the 
admissibility  of  latent  print  individualization  evidence  in 
Frye  jurisdictions  have  generally  adopted  the  tactic  of 
trying to backdoor Daubert by urging courts to consider the 
Daubert factors in making their Frye determinations.54 Such 
tactics have not met with success.
C. DAUBERT CHALLENGES TO LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE
Daubert  challenges to latent  print  evidence have not 
met with success either. Numerous published opinions have 
ruled on admissibility challenges to latent print evidence in 
Daubert  jurisdictions.55 With  some  qualified  exceptions, 
these opinions have all  ruled latent print individualization 
evidence admissible. Indeed, even the qualified exceptions 
generally  rule  latent  print  individualization  evidence  in 
general  admissible,  while  excluding  some  specific 
application of it.56
52
5
. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 
(1993) (“Although the  Frye decision itself focused exclusively on ‘novel’ 
scientific  techniques,  we do not read the requirements  of  Rule 702 to 
apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence.”).
53 . Giannelli, supra note 40, at 1098.
54 . See, e.g., People v. Clevenger, 2003 WL 22872446 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003).
55 . For  a  review,  see   One  web  site  lists  more  than  40  Daubert 
challenges to latent print evidence, not all  of which are published.  See 
Legal  Challenges  to  Fingerprints, 
http://www.onin.com/fp/daubert_links.html (last visited May 24, 2008).
56 . Legal Challenges to Fingerprints, http://www.onin.com/fp/daubert_ 
links.html (last visited May 24, 2008).
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This lack of  success has been at stark odds with the 
weight of opinion in legal  scholarship, nearly all  of  which 
concludes  that  latent  print  individualization  evidence,  as 
currently constituted, does not satisfy the Daubert standard 
for  admissibility.57 Although  I  believe  that  latent  print 
individualization evidence must be inadmissible under any 
reasonable  reading  of  Daubert,58 it  now  appears  that  a 
litigant  may,  contrary  to  conventional  wisdom,  have  a 
better chance of success in a motion to exclude latent print 
evidence in a Frye jurisdiction.
There are several reasons for this. First, at some point 
the  precedential  weight  of  the  admissibility  rulings  will 
preclude admissibility motions under  Daubert.  Already, in 
2004, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals tried not so subtly 
to  put  this  issue  to  rest  in  its  opinion  upholding  the 
admissibility  of  latent  print  individualization  evidence.59 
Second, the Daubert standard is notoriously vague. Indeed, 
vagueness  is  one  of  the  opinion’s  principal  flaws  for  its 
many  critics.60 The  vagueness  of  the  Daubert standard 
principally  lies,  first,  in  the  refusal  to  specify  the  five 
“Daubert factors” as a “definitive checklist or test.” Second, 
trial court decisions are subject to the abuse of discretion 
review.61 These factors combine to create a regime in which 
trial judges can follow their intuitions with very little risk of 
being overturned. It is very difficult for a trial court to err 
under  Daubert  because most decisions with which higher 
courts may disagree can be explained as either exercises of 
the trial judge’s discretion in framing the Daubert inquiry or 
exercises  of  the  trial  judge’s  discretion  in  making  the 
57
5
. Infra note 241.
58 . See  Simon  A.  Cole,  Grandfathering  Evidence:  Fingerprint 
Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to  Llera Plaza and Back Again,  41 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (2004) [hereinafter Cole, Grandfathering].
59 . United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004). (“[A] 
district court would not abuse its discretion by limiting, in a proper case, 
the scope of a Daubert hearing to novel challenges to the admissibility of 
latent  fingerprint  identification  evidence—or  even  dispensing  with  the 
hearing altogether  if  no  novel  challenge was raised.”);  Simon A.  Cole, 
Does  ‘Yes’  Really  Mean  Yes?  The  Attempt  to  Close  Debate  on  the 
Admissibility  of  Fingerprint  Testimony,  45  JURIMETRICS 449,  452  (2005) 
[hereinafter Cole, Yes].
60
6
. See, e.g., John H. Mansfield, Scientific Evidence Under Daubert, 28 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 45 (1996).
61 . General Electric Co. v.  Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 136–37 (1997).
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ultimate admissibility determination. It has been suggested 
that Daubert challenges to latent print evidence have failed 
not because there has been any empirical demonstration of 
the  technique’s  accuracy  or  validity,  but  because  latent 
print  evidence  benefits  from  a  high  degree  of  what 
comedian  Stephen  Colbert  has  called  “truthiness,”  an 
instinctual belief that something is true even if no factual 
basis for that belief exists.62 In other words, perhaps trial 
judges believe that latent print evidence is accurate, even if 
the proponents of the evidence cannot demonstrate it, and, 
therefore, they are inclined to look for ways to find that the 
evidence  satisfies  Daubert.  If  latent  print  admissibility 
rulings  are  indeed  outcome  oriented,  then  a  vague 
admissibility  standard  with  a  wide  range  of  judicial 
discretion gives judges more room to follow their instincts. 
Thus, a vague standard like  Daubert is not conducive for 
unpopular litigants seeking a radical change like restricting 
the admissibility of latent print individualization evidence.63
This  point  is  supported  by  the  recent  Daubert 
jurisprudence  on  latent  print  evidence  admissibility.  The 
earliest opinions tended to adopt tortured readings of the 
Daubert factors in order to find that latent print evidence 
met  all  the  factors  with  flying  colors.64 More  recent 
decisions,  however,  tend  to  find  latent  print  evidence 
admissible  despite  what  would  appear  to  be  shocking 
lapses in terms of the Daubert factors. For example, United 
States  v.  Llera  Plaza  (Llera  Plaza  II) finds  latent  print 
62
6
. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 35, at 66 (“It is easy to 
see why judges are reluctant to exclude fingerprinting: it is a long-used 
technique, an extremely valuable form of evidence to prosecutors, and 
one  in  which  the  public  has  enormous  faith.”);  Jacques  Steinberg, 
Truthiness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005.
63 . The vagueness of  Daubert  has been exacerbated, I would argue, 
by  the  five-factor  list.   The  list  has  drawn both  judicial  and  scholarly 
attention away from the concept it was meant to elucidate: “reliability.” 
By focusing on the list, which is vague and which the Daubert Court had 
specified was not intended to be “definitive,” rather than on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (FRE) relevance and reliability requirement, which is 
neither  flexible  nor  vague,  judges  and  scholars  have  overstated  the 
flexibility  and vagueness  of  Daubert.  If  Daubert  rulings are  outcome-
oriented, the outcome is usually achieved by interpreting the five-factor 
list, not the FRE reliability requirement.
64 . Michael J. Saks,  Reliability Standards: Too High, Too Low, or Just  
Right? The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially 
Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167 (2003).
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evidence  admissible  despite  satisfying  only  the 
standards/error  rate  and  general  acceptance  prongs.65 
United States v. Sullivan  found it admissible despite being 
“testable,  although  untested.”66 Finally,  United  States  v. 
Mitchell  found it  admissible  despite  failing  the  standards 
prong and meeting the testing prong not with true testing, 
but  only  with  “implicit  testing.”67 None of  these opinions 
have won praise among evidence scholars, and one could 
make  a  strong  argument  that  they  are  erroneous 
applications  of  Daubert.  But,  in  the  final  analysis,  it  is 
difficult to say that these opinions are absolute violations of 
Daubert, rather than the “flexible” interpretations of it that 
that Supreme Court seemed to call for.
The  Frye general  acceptance  test,  though  it  too 
contains unresolved ambiguities,68 is  at  least less flexible 
and vague than  Daubert.  Indeed,  Frye has been criticized 
for  the  supposed  rigidity  of  its  “nose  counting”  test.69 
However, as I will argue below, properly conducted, a nose 
counting  test  actually  favors  criminal  defendants. 
Unpopular litigants with unpopular causes like latent print 
admissibility  challenges  should  want  a  rigid  admissibility 
standard that leaves the court with less discretion.
D. “THE THING FROM WHICH THE DEDUCTION IS MADE”: WHAT MUST BE 
“GENERALLY ACCEPTED”?
The first step in analyzing latent print individualization 
under Frye is defining what it is that needs to be generally 
accepted. A general acceptance analysis might yield quite 
different results depending on how the claim is formulated. 
To use the original  Frye  case as an example, a court that 
asked  whether  the  ability  of  a  lie  detector  device  to 
accurately  detect  deception  is  generally  accepted  would 
65
6
. 188  F.  Supp.  2d  549,  576  (E.D.  Pa.  2002)  (concluding  that 
arrangements  found  sufficiently  reliable  in  England  should  be  found 
reliable in the United States).
66 . United  States  v.  Sullivan, 246  F.  Supp.  2d  700,  704  (E.D.  Ky. 
2003).
67 . 365 F.3d at 238;  see also Simon A. Cole,  ‘Implicit Testing’: Can 
Casework  Validate  Forensic  Techniques?, 46  JURIMETRICS 117,  126 (2006) 
[hereinafter Cole, Implicit Testing].
68 . See, e.g., 
69 . Joseph  D.  Hatina,  Shaken  Baby  Syndrome:  Who  Are  the  True 
Experts?, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557, 572 n.125 (1998).
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get quite a different result from a court that asked whether 
the  lie  detector’s  utility  in  exacting  confessions  was 
generally accepted.70 Similarly, a court that asked whether 
the ability of a lie detector to detect deception some of the 
time was generally  accepted would find quite a different 
result than a court that asked whether the ability of a lie 
detector to detect deception with a high degree of accuracy 
was  generally  accepted.  In  the  case  of  latent  print 
evidence,  a court might  find a very high rate  of  general 
acceptance  if  it  asked  whether  the  “relevant  scientific 
community”  accepts  that  latent  print  identification  is  a 
“good” or “useful” thing or that latent print identification is 
“sometimes”  or  “often”  accurate  or  “can”  be  done 
accurately.  Similarly,  the  proposition  that  latent  print 
source  attributions  are  to  be  made  accurately  from 
complete sets of ten rolled prints might enjoy an extremely 
high rate of  general  acceptance, whereas the proposition 
that  latent  print  source  attributions  are  made accurately 
from  single  partial  “latent”  prints  might  command  a  far 
lower rate of general acceptance.
How then should “the thing from which the deduction is 
made”  be  formulated  in  a  Frye  challenge to  latent  print 
evidence? Given that it is possible to “game” the state of 
general  acceptance  through  the  formulation  of  the 
proposition to be accepted, it would seem that the only fair 
way to proceed is to evalaute the formulation to which the 
proffered expert witness proposes to testify. In this regard, 
courts faced with  Frye  challenges to latent print evidence 
are fortunate because the professional community of latent 
print examiners is quite explicit about what it is that they 
claim to be able to do. According to professional guidelines, 
inculpatory latent print testimony can take only one form: a 
testimonial claim of “individualization,” which is defined as 
the  conclusion  that  the  source  of  the  known  print  (the 
defendant) is the only possible source of a latent print, to 
the exclusion of all other possible sources in the universe.71 
70
7
. See generally  KEN ALDER, THE LIE DETECTORS: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN  
OBSESSION (2007).
71 . SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS STUDY & TECHNOLOGY, 
FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINATION METHODOLOGY FOR LATENT PRINT EXAMINERS 3 (2002), 
available  at http://www.swgfast.org/Friction_ 
Ridge_Examination_Methodology_for_Latent_Print_Examiners_1.01.pdf. 
[hereinafter SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP, FRICTION RIDGE EXAMINATION].
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This is the strongest possible conclusion that any forensic 
analyst could offer in regard to the source of a trace, and 
latent print examiners offer it every time they testify to an 
inculpation.  The  ability  of  latent  print  analysis  to 
individualize, then, is the “thing” from which the deduction 
that  the  defendant  is  the  source  of  the  latent  print  to 
exclusion of all other possible sources is made. Therefore, it 
is  the ability  of  latent print analysis to individualize that, 
under Frye, needs to be generally accepted in the “relevant 
scientific community.”72
It is often suggested, however, that it is the underlying 
“premises”  of  the  technique,  not  the  accuracy  of  the 
technique  itself,  which  must  be  generally  accepted.  A 
common tactic in both admissibility hearings and in latent 
print  examiners’  own  literature  has  been  to  advance 
evidence  supporting  the  “premises”  of  latent  print 
individualization  instead  of  evidence  supporting  the 
accuracy  of  the  technique  itself.73 Specifically,  in 
admissibility hearings, the government has spent a great 
deal  of  time  demonstrating  the  “uniqueness”  and 
“permanence”  of  friction  ridge  skin  (the  anatomical 
structure  of  which  finger,  palm,  and  sole  prints  are 
impressions),  rather  than  the  accuracy  of  latent  print 
individualization. Could it be that “the thing from which the 
deduction is made” is the uniqueness of all human friction 
ridge skin? It cannot. The conclusion that a single area of 
friction ridge skin is the only possible source of a particular 
latent print is not a logical deduction from the proposition 
that all friction ridge skin is unique. Just because the skin is 
unique,  it  does  not  follow  that  an  analytic  process  is 
sufficiently diagnostic to always identify the true source of 
an impression of that unique skin.
72
7
. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  Some 
readers of this article have questioned why I have not formulated “the 
thing” more generously  in a way that  would  command higher  general 
acceptance.   I  must  admit  to  being  somewhat  perplexed  by  this 
suggestion, given that the latent print community has the full capacity to 
formulate its claim, however it so chooses.  It is certainly true that there 
would probably be a high rate of general acceptance if the claim were 
formulated as follows: “latent print analysis can correctly attribute source 
for  complete  sets  of  prints.”  But  this  is  not  how  the  latent  print 
community  and  those  who  proffer  latent  print  examiners  as  expert 
witnesses have formulated the claim.
73 .
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Moreover, as a matter of common sense, legal scholars 
and  at  least  one  court74 have  noted  that  it  would  defy 
common  sense  to  allow  acceptance  of  the  underlying 
“premises”  of  the  technique  to  be  sufficient  for 
admissibility; surely the issue in a Frye inquiry is not merely 
whether  the  premises  of  the  technique  are  generally 
accepted but also whether or not it is generally accepted 
that the technique itself does what it claims to be able to 
do.75
II. CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE
APPLICATIONS OF FRYE
The Frye  rule has come under frequent criticism over 
the years. Scholars have argued that applying the Frye rule 
is not nearly as clear-cut as it might appear at first glance. 
Two difficulties applying Frye, in particular, have generated 
concern. One is how the “relevant scientific community” is 
defined.  The  second  is  how  “general  acceptance”  is 
measured.76
A. CONSTITUTING THE “RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY”
Critics  of  Frye  have  pointed  out  that  the  “relevant 
scientific community” is not always obvious.77 For example, 
situations  may  arise  in  which  one  specialist  community 
“accepts” a particular principle or technique, while another 
74
7
. State v. Velasco, 799 P.2d 821, 827 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc) (“The 
question is not whether the scientific community has concluded that the 
scientific  principle  or  process  is  absolutely  perfect,  but  whether  the 
principle or process is generally accepted to be capable of doing what it 
purports to do.”).
75 . On the distinction between the validity  of  a technique and the 
theory  behind  it,  see  See  also   (“For  testimony  to  be  sufficiently 
probative  to  warrant  admission . . .  the  fundamental  theory  and  the 
existence of a valid procedure for taking the necessary measurements 
and drawing the appropriate inferences needs to be established.”). The 
uniqueness  of  all  human  friction  ridge  skin  may  logically  count  as  a 
“premise”  of  latent  print  individualization—it  is  a  necessary  but  not 
sufficient condition of the claim of individualization—but I would question 
its status as a “theory.”  The claim of uniqueness does not purport to 
explain  how  or  why  analyses  by  latent  print  examiners  result  in 
individualization, it merely proposes that the targets of their analyses are 
“unique.”
76 . DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH 
ISSUES 8 (2002).
77 .
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specialist  community  is  more  skeptical.  Such  “cases  of 
extra-disciplinary competition of credentialed experts” may 
take several  forms.78 In  some cases,  acceptance may be 
greater in one discipline than in another. In other cases, the 
disagreement may pit a practitioner community against a 
community of scientists.79
1. Practitioners Only
Can a technique satisfy the Frye rule if it is accepted by 
practitioners, but not by the broader scientific community? 
The  Frye  case  itself,  as  well  as  subsequent  cases 
concerning  polygraph  evidence,  were  practitioner-only 
cases. Practitioners of lie detector tests “accepted” them as 
valid,  whereas  the  broader  scientific  community,  defined 
variously  as  psychologists,  physiologists,  or  neurologists, 
was  more  skeptical.  This  was  also  the  case  in  voice 
spectrography  cases,  in  which  practitioners  of  the 
technique  accepted  it  as  valid,  whereas  the  scientific 
community, consisting of audiologists, acousticians, speech 
scientists,  acoustical  engineers,  anatomists,  electrical 
engineers, linguists, phoneticists, physicists, physiologists, 
psychologists,  and  statisticians,  was  more  skeptical.80 In 
such  cases,  if  the  “relevant  scientific  community”  was 
defined  as  the  practitioner  community,  the  technique 
appeared  to  be  generally  accepted,  but  if  the  “relevant 
scientific community” was defined as the broader scientific 
community,  it  may  not  have  been.81 Thus,  as  Professors 
Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and Sanders have pointed out, how 
the “relevant scientific community” is defined determined 
the  outcome  of  the  Frye  inquiry  in  every  voice 
spectrography case.82
By and large, however, there is little disagreement on 
the issue of whether practitioners alone can constitute the 
“relevant  scientific  community.”  Courts  have  generally 
78
7
. Brewer, supra note 6, at 1633.
79 . Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 97 139 (1984).
80
8
. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 296 n.4 
(2002) [hereinafter, FAIGMAN, FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES].
81 . Id. at 297.
82 . Id.;  Giannelli,  supra  note  10,  at  1214  (noting  that  “general 
acceptance  of  the  polygraph  is  almost  assured  if  the  opinions  of 
[polygraph] examiners are considered”).
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found that practitioner-only acceptance cannot satisfy the 
Frye  rule.  In  Frye  itself,  the  systolic  blood  pressure  test 
failed  because  it  was  not  generally  accepted  “among 
physiological  and  psychological  authorities,”  rather  than, 
say,  being admitted  because it  was  accepted by  William 
Moulton Marston, its developer, and his disciples.83
Maryland’s case adopting the Frye rule,  Reed v. State, 
chided the trial court for restricting the “relevant scientific 
community” to “the group actually engaged in the use of 
this  technique  and  in  the  experimentation  with  this 
technique.”84 The court wrote:
[W]e find that the trial court’s formulation is inconsistent with the 
proper  standard  of  acceptance  necessary  for  admissibility.  The 
circumstances of the instant case suggest no basis for “restricting 
the  relevant  field  of  experts”  to  those  who  have  performed 
voiceprint  experiments,  and eliminating from consideration  the 
opinions of those scientists in the fields of speech and hearing, as 
well  as  related  fields,  who,  by  training  and  education,  are 
competent  to  make  professional  judgments  concerning 
experiments undertaken by others. The purpose of the Frye test is 
defeated  by  an  approach  which  allows  a  court  to  ignore  the 
informed  opinions  of  a  substantial  segment  of  the  scientific 
community  which  stands  in  opposition  to  the  process  in 
question.85
The Arizona Supreme Court agreed.86
The  Alaska  courts  have  not  only  included  non-
practitioners  in  the  “relevant  scientific  community,”  but 
have  even  excluded  practitioners.  In  Contreras  v.  State, 
regarding hypnosis, the Supreme Court of Alaska wrote:
We define  the  relevant  scientific  community  as  the  academic, 
scientific,  and  medical  or  health-care  professions  which  have 
studied and/or utilized hypnosis for clinical, therapeutic, research 
and investigative applications.  It  does not include those whose 
involvement with hypnosis is strictly limited to that of practitioner, 
technician  or  “operator” . . . .  We exclude  technicians from the 
group  because  Frye requires  scientific,  not  merely  technical, 
judgments to be made.87
83
8
. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
84 . Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (Md. 1978).
85 . Id.
86 . State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1285 (Ariz. 
1982)  (“This  requirement is  not  satisfied with  testimony from a single 
expert  or  group  of  experts  who  personally  believe  the  challenged 
procedure is accepted or is reliable.”).
87 . Contreras  v.  State, 718 P.2d 129,  135 (Alaska  1986);  see also 
Trout-Clark v. State, No. A-4666, 1993 WL 13157037, *4 (Alaska App. Oct. 
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The courts’ rationale for evincing skepticism concerning 
techniques that are accepted only by practitioners appears 
to have been motivated principally by two concerns. First, 
practitioners tend to be materially interested in the validity 
of  the  technique.  That  is,  they  tend  to  stand  to  benefit 
financially  if  the  technique  is  legitimated  by  a  favorable 
admissibility  ruling  in  the  courts.  Therefore,  such 
individuals’ “acceptance” of the technique should be taken 
with a grain of salt. For example, a Florida District Court of 
Appeal  excluded polygraph evidence because  “[t]he  only 
testimony was from two people who earn a living by giving 
polygraph tests.”88 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
stated
While one would not want an expert witness without experience 
or background in the technical field, one would want, where the 
task  was  to  demonstrate  general  scientific  acceptability,  an 
acknowledgment of the value of the device and the techniques by 
disinterested  scientists  whose  livelihood  was  not  intimately 
connected with it.89
In a later case, the court stated:
To allow general scientific acceptance to be established on the 
testimony  alone  of  witnesses  whose  livelihood  is  intimately 
connected with a new technique would eliminate the safeguard of 
scientific  community  approval  implicit  in  the  general  scientific 
acceptance test.  Scientific community approval is absent where 
those who have developed and whose reputation and livelihood 
20,  1993)  (excluding  horizontal  gaze  nystagmus  evidence  because 
testimony  of  practitioner  did  not  suffice  for  general  acceptance  in 
relevant  scientific  community);  Halley  v.  State,  No.  A3463,  1991  WL 
11650674, *3 (Alaska App. Jan. 16, 1991) (excluding preliminary breath 
test evidence because testimony of practitioner did not suffice for general 
acceptance in relevant  scientific  community);  Haakanson v.  State,  760 
P.2d 1030, 1034 (Alaska App. 1988) (finding polygraph evidence failed to 
satisfy  Frye  because  polygraph  examiner,  in  contrast  to  defendant’s 
expert, a Psychology Professor, was not member of the relevant scientific 
community). Alaska has since adopted Daubert.  See State v. Coon,  974 
P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1999).
88
8
. State v. Thompkins, 891 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2005).
89 . People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Mich. 1977);  see also 
People v. Coy, 669 N.W.2d 831, 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (per curium) 
(“When demonstrating that there is general scientific recognition of novel 
scientific techniques or principles, it is necessary to present the testimony 
of disinterested and impartial experts whose livelihood is not intimately 
connected  with  the  technique  at  issue.”);  Collins,  644  P.2d  at  1285 
(“Acceptance must be by those experts who are relatively disinterested 
and impartial and whose livelihood, therefore, is not intimately connected 
with approval of the technique.”).
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depends on use of the new technique alone certify, in effect self-
certify,  the validity  of  the  technique . . . .  If  this  Court  were  to 
adopt the view that the testimony of persons who have developed 
and whose reputation and livelihood depends on the use of a new 
technique  alone  supports  admissibility,  then  the  views  of  the 
developer and his disciples would be substituted for the scrutiny 
of the marketplace of general scientific opinion and the substance 
of the Frye test would be eliminated.90
Courts have also recognized, however, that even beside 
financial interest, practitioners are vulnerable to developing 
a personal stake in the validity of a technique. Having spent 
a  great  deal  of  their  professional  time  on  developing, 
learning,  disseminating,  or  advocating  the  technique, 
practitioners  may  find  it  very  difficult  to  simply  concede 
that  the  technique  is  not  valid,  no  matter  what  the 
empirical  evidence.  As  the  Florida  court  went  on  to  say 
about  polygraph  evidence,  “Frye requires  more  than  the 
testimony of  an  expert  who has  a personal  stake in  the 
theory or is prone to an institutional bias.”91 In  People v. 
Kelly, the Supreme Court of California viewed the testimony 
of  a  leading  practitioner  of  voice  spectrography  with 
caution because “he has virtually  built  his  career on the 
reliability of the technique.”92 A California appellate court in 
an  earlier  case went  further,  arguing,  as  had the  Alaska 
Supreme Court, to exclude practitioners from the “relevant 
scientific community,” stating that in deciding whether “a 
technique or process is generally accepted in the scientific 
community,  self-serving  opinions  should  not  be 
received . . .”93
About  the  idea  of  allowing  practitioners  to  constitute 
the “relevant scientific community,” the Eighth Circuit Court 
of  Appeals said this:  “[s]ome commentators have posited 
the argument that the polygraph need only attain general 
acceptance among the polygraph operators themselves to 
satisfy the test for admissibility . . . . This position must be 
rejected.”94 Instead, the court suggested that courts might 
turn to the mainstream scientific  community:  “Experts  in 
neurology,  psychiatry  and  physiology  may  offer  needed 
90
9
. People  v.  Young,  391  N.W.2d  270,  276  n.24  (Mich.  1986) 
(emphasis added).
91 . Thompkins, 891 So.2d at 1152.
92 . People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249 (Cal. 1976).
93 . People v. King, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
94 . United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975).
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enlightenment upon the  basic  premises  of  polygraphy.”95 
The Third Circuit  also noted disapprovingly “some courts, 
when they wish to  admit  evidence,  are  able  to  limit  the 
impact  of  Frye by  narrowing  the  “relevant  scientific 
community” to those experts who customarily employ the 
technique at issue.”96 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court 
noted,  “[i]n  applying  the  Frye criteria,  general  scientific 
recognition requires the testimony of impartial  experts or 
scientists.  It  is  this  independent  and  impartial  proof  of 
general scientific acceptability that provides the necessary 
Frye foundation.”97
Significantly,  although  some  courts  have  functionally 
narrowed  the  “relevant  scientific  community,”  most 
commonly  in  cases  upholding  the  admissibility  of  voice 
spectrography, in almost none of those cases have courts 
defended  or  even  articulated  limiting  the  “relevant 
scientific community” to practitioners as a  principle.98 One 
exception is the Minnesota Supreme Court, which disagreed 
with the Michigan Supreme Court’s insistence on relying on 
relatively  disinterested  experts.99 There  are  also  some 
cases in which evidence is deemed admissible when it “has 
obtained  general  acceptance  in  only  one  branch  of 
science,”  such  as  techniques  that  are  accepted  only  in 
forensic chemistry, but not in chemistry generally.100 Such 
situations are quite different from the situation for latent 
prints, in which the technique is only accepted, not by a 
“branch of science,” but by practitioners of the technique, 
95
9
. Id.
96 . United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985).
97 . Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 851 (Fla. 2001).
98 . See, e.g., Hodo v. Superior Court, Riverside County, 106 Cal. Rptr. 
547 passim (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671 
passim (Mass. 1975); People v. Bein, 453 N.Y.S.2d 343 passim (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct.  1982); United States v. Maivia, 728 F. Supp. 1471 passim (D. Haw. 
1990).
99 . State  v.  Fenney,  448 N.W.2d 54,  60 (Minn.  1989)  (“The  Young 
decision is flawed from the Minnesota perspective because of the court’s 
requirement that witnesses qualified to testify as members of the relevant 
scientific community must be ‘disinterested and impartial’ experts whose 
‘livelihood [is]  not  intimately  connected with  the new technique.’  .  .  . 
Minnesota’s interpretation of Frye requires ‘experts in its field’ and has no 
such narrow requirement of disinterestedness.”).
100
1
. See  Robinson v.  State,  425 A.2d 211,  220  (Md.  Ct.  Spec.  App. 
1981).
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the vast majority of whom do not have scientific training.101
To be sure, courts have acknowledged that a balance 
must  be  struck  between  finding  experts  who  are 
knowledgeable  with  the  technique  and  those  who  are 
disinterested. A completely disinterested expert may lack 
knowledge.102 Therefore, courts have required only relative 
disinterest.103 The  point  here  is  merely  that  it  is  well 
established that  courts  have  reason for  skepticism when 
general acceptance emanates  only  from practitioners with 
a  degree  of  both  financial  and  emotional  interest  in  the 
101
1
. Latent print examiners themselves do not appear to be scientists, 
at  least  in  the  conventional  sense  of  being  trained  in,  and  acquiring 
advanced degrees in, science.  Historically,  latent  print examiners have 
been drawn from the ranks of law enforcement officers and identification 
bureau  clerks,  and  scientific  training  was  not  a  credential  required  to 
analyze  latent  prints.  David  L.  Grieve,  The  Identification  Process: 
Traditions in Training, 40 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 195 passim (1990).  Even 
today,  after the profession instituted formal educational requirements—
perhaps  in  response  to  criticisms  of  the  lack  of  training  standards 
exposed  in  early  Daubert  challenges—SWGFAST  guidelines  only 
recommend a bachelor’s degree in science.   Work experience can still 
compensate for the lack of such a degree, according to SWGFAST. Since 
the SWGFAST guidelines are not binding on law enforcement agencies 
and are of recent origin, many practicing latent print examiners may fall 
short of even these modest scientific credentials.
Even  if  latent  print  examiners  did  all  possess  SWGFAST’s 
recommended credential, the B.S. degree, it is not clear that they would 
properly be considered scientists.  Most working scientists would probably 
want to see an advanced degree in science before calling an individual a 
“scientist.”  Although, I am aware of a handful of individual latent print 
examiners who possess such degree, it would seem that they are a small 
minority  in  the  profession.   One  study  found  that  only  3%  of  crime 
laboratory directors require a M.S. degree for a position as a firearms, 
document, or fingerprint examiner, and only 2% require a Ph.D. Kenneth 
G.  Furton  et  al.,  What  Educational  Background  Do  Crime  Laboratory 
Directors  Require  from Applicants, 44  J.  FORENSIC SCI.  128,  131  (1999). 
Moreover, it appears likely that these credential requirements may reflect 
crime  laboratory  directors’  aspirations  more  than  the  true  credentials 
available to them in the labor market.  It is difficult to imagine a crime 
laboratory  requiring  a  Ph.D.  for  a  position  in  firearms,  document,  or 
fingerprint  examination,  and  it  is  equally  difficult  to  imagine  them 
successfully filling the position with such an individual.  I am not aware of 
any latent print examiner who has this credential, though I am aware of 
one individual who is seeking a doctoral degree in forensic science (Glenn 
Langenburg  of  the  Minnesota  Bureau  of  Criminal  Apprehension.  Trial 
Transcript,  State v.   Columbus,  No.  04082599 (Minn.  Hennepin County 
Dist. Ct. May 18, 2006).).
To be sure,  it  is  possible to  argue that  latent  print examiners  are 
credential-less  scientists.   We would  not  necessarily  want  to  take  the 
position that an individual or group of individuals who are clearly doing 
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perpetuation of the technique.
Evidence  scholars  also  agree  that  practitioner 
communities alone cannot satisfy the general  acceptance 
requirement. Professor Black notes that such definitions of 
the relevant scientific  community would “allow[]  a group 
that  advocates  a  technique  or  method  to  self-validate  it 
simply by declaring acceptance.”104 This would also allow 
self-validation  by  astrologers,  cults,  and  what  Professor 
Schwartz colorfully calls “mutual admiration societ[ies].”105 
Professor  Schwartz  notes  that  if  the  “relevant  scientific 
community”  consists  solely  of  individuals  whose 
“professional  reputations  and  commercial  interests . . . 
depend on validation of the technique, general acceptance 
may  be  a  foregone  conclusion . . . .”106 Specifically  with 
scientific  work,  but  lack  formal  advanced  degrees,  could  not  be 
considered  scientists.   For  example,  there  are  talented  amateur 
astronomers who make what are considered by professional astronomers 
to  be  genuine  contributions  to  astronomical  knowledge.  For  these 
exceptional individuals, their lack of a doctoral degree in astronomy does 
not negate their contribution to the corpus of scientific knowledge. Some 
latent  print  examiners  have  invoked  this  argument,  claiming  that  a 
scientist is one who analyzes and compares.  Simon A. Cole, What Counts 
for  Identity?  The  Historical  Origins  of  the  Methodology  of  Latent 
Fingerprint Identification, 12 SCI. CONTEXT 139, 144 (1999).  Whatever the 
merits of this argument for latent print examiners, it does not help the 
court performing a Frye inquiry.  The inquiry would still be hampered by 
the absence of a relevant scientific community, which would legitimate 
latent  print  examiners’  scientific  claims  in  the  way  that  professional 
astronomers legitimate the claims of talented amateur astronomers.
It might perhaps be argued that latent print examiners constitute a 
credential-less  scientific  community  that  lacks  affirmation  from  a 
conventionally credentialed scientific community. The trouble is, it is not 
clear  how  a  court  would  distinguish  such  a  community  from,  say,  a 
community of like-minded practitioners united by financial interest in the 
perpetuation of their technique and the deluded belief that the technique 
“works.”  I am not suggesting here that latent print examiners are one 
type  of  community  or  the  other;  merely  that  a  proper  Frye  inquiry 
requires a heuristic for distinguishing one from the other.
102
1
. This  is  an  old  problem  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  See 
generally, JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1971).
103 . People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d 270, 275 (Mich. 1986) (“A certain 
degree of ‘interest’ must be tolerated if scientists familiar with the theory 
and practice of a new technique are to testify at all.”).
104 . Bert Black,  A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence,  56  FORDHAM L. 
REV. 595, 633 (1988).
105 .
106 . Id. at  207;  see also Jay P.  Kesan,  A Critical  Examination of  the 
Post-Daubert Scientific Evidence Landscape, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 240 
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regard to latent  print  individualization,  Professor  Mnookin 
notes,  “[w]hen  there  is  challenge  to  the  fundamental 
reliability  of  a  technique  through  which  the  practitioners 
make  their  living,  there  is  good  reason  to  be  especially 
dubious about ‘general acceptance’” in that community.107
As three evidence scholars note in a prominent treatise:
[A]  practitioner-only  rule  could  leave  an  entire  field  largely 
immune from appropriate criticism. The practice of handwriting 
analysis, for example, is conducted by those who believe in it. The 
only plausible experts who can testify critically on the reliability of 
handwriting  analysis  are  analysts  who  have  developed  second 
thoughts, the few academics who have conducted experimental 
studies of handwriting analysis, or the potentially greater number 
of academics who have studied the literature on the validity of 
handwriting analysis.108
Instead,  they  suggest,  “[a]  requirement  of  acceptance 
among  ‘disinterested  scientists’  helps  ensure  that  the 
community in which acceptance is determined consists of 
more than a handful of devotees of the theory or technique 
in question.”109 Elsewhere, they note:
Constricting the scientific community to forensic scientists is not 
an adequate solution. As a formal matter, it resolves the problem 
of  applying  the  general  acceptance  test  to  “forensic-only” 
evidence,  but  this  limited  acceptance  does  not  necessarily 
demonstrate  that  the  scientific  theories  or  techniques  can  be 
relied  on  in  court. . . .  [I]f  crime  laboratories  adopt  a  method 
before it has been adequately validated, this version of “general 
acceptance” will not detect the gap in the scientific foundation for 
the expert testimony.110
2. Breadth
“Cases of extra-disciplinary competition of credentialed 
experts”  may  also  arise  when  a  specialist  community 
“accepts”  a  principle  or  technique,  but  the  broader 
(1997) (“[T]he technique always will be deemed reliable and valid if the 
inquiry is limited to practitioners of the technique.”).
107
1
. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 35, at 63.
108 .  Everything  in  this  passage applies  equally  well  to  latent  print 
evidence,  with the exception that the number of  academics who have 
conducted experimental studies may be even smaller.
109 . Id. at 180.  I would suggest that there is no good reason to think 
that the principle would not still apply even if, as in the case of latent 
print evidence, the devotees number more than a “handful.”
110 . Id. at 443.
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community is less convinced.111 Sociologists of science have 
shown that it is not uncommon for a small community close 
to a particular problem to have a different consensus view 
than the broader disciplinary community more conceptually 
distant  from  a  problem.112 For  example,  the  state  of 
“general acceptance” of certain scientific knowledge claims 
would be quite different among physicists who work with 
gravity-wave detectors  than among physicists  in  general. 
Both groups are undoubtedly “scientific communities,” and 
they  may  be  equally  well  credentialed.  But  the  state  of 
general acceptance would be quite different depending on 
how  narrowly  or  broadly  the  “relevant  scientific 
community” is defined.
We  might  call  this  “the  problem  of  breadth.”  How 
broadly  should  the  “relevant  scientific  community”  be 
defined? In the above example, is the “relevant scientific 
community” for claims about gravity waves, gravity-wave 
physicists,  experimental  physicists,  all  physicists,  or even 
all  scientists?  Conceptually,  the  problem of  breadth  is  a 
difficult problem. Narrow definitions of community have the 
virtue of capturing a community in which most members 
will have a high degree of familiarity with and knowledge 
about the claim in question. But such communities will also 
have the vice of consisting of members who are more likely 
to have an entrenched or vested interest, whether financial 
or emotional, in the claims in question. Likewise, a broad 
community  will  have  the  virtue  of  a  community  of 
individuals  with  little  vested interest  in  the  problem.  But 
such a community may not have the depth of familiarity as 
the narrower community.
The courts,  however,  have not  found the problem of 
breadth all that conceptually difficult. Instead, virtually all 
courts  have  articulated  a  preference  construing  the 
“relevant  scientific  community”  broadly,  rather  than 
narrowly.  The  courts’  rationale  appears  to  be  implicitly 
based on the idea, commonly espoused by sociologists and 
philosophers  of  science,  that  unfettered  criticism  is 
necessary  to  produce  robust  knowledge.113 The  courts 
111
1
. Brewer, supra note 6, at 1633.
112 . H. M. Collins,  Certainty and the Public Understanding of Science: 
Science on Television, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 689, 692 (1987).
113 . ROBERT K.  MERTON,  SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE:  TOWARD THE 
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appear to recognize that breadth is necessary to generate 
what the Florida Supreme Court described as “the kind of 
searching,  critical  review  that  is  the  sine  qua  non of 
scientific  acceptance.”114 For  example,  California’s  case 
adopting the  Frye rule,  People  v.  Kelly,  noted,  “[i]deally, 
resolution of  the general  acceptance issue would require 
consideration of the views of a typical cross-section of the 
scientific community, including representatives, if there are 
such,  of  those  who  oppose  or  question  the  new 
technique.”115
The  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts,  in  a 
similar  fashion,  asserted  that  the  “relevant  scientific 
community must be defined broadly enough to include a 
sufficiently broad sample of scientists so that the possibility 
of disagreement exists.”116 The court cautioned trial judges 
not  to  “define  the  ‘relevant  scientific  community’  so 
narrowly  that  the  expert’s  opinion  will  inevitably  be 
considered generally accepted.”117 In People v. Watson, the 
Appellate Court of Illinois agreed with the trial court opinion 
“that  too  narrow  a  definition  of  the  pertinent  scientific 
community  would  render  the  Frye standard  meaningless 
and ineffective.”118 The Appellate Court added, “[w]e have 
found overwhelming support for this view in the decisions 
of  other  courts  which  have  confronted  this  issue.”119 In 
CODIFICATION OF THEORY AND RESEARCH (1949); KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS 
29 (1965).
114
1
. Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 850 (Fla. 2001).
115 . People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1976).
116 . Canavan’s  Case,  733 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 n.6  (Mass.  2000);  see 
also  Bernardoni  v.  Industrial  Com’n,  840 N.E.2d 300,  311 (Ill.  App.  Ct. 
2005) (“A court must not define the relevant field of experts so narrowly 
that the expert’s opinion inevitably will be considered generally accepted. 
If the community is defined to include only those experts who subscribe 
to the same beliefs as the testifying expert,  the opinion always will be 
admissible. The community of experts must include a sufficiently broad 
sample of experts so that the possibility of disagreement exists.”).
117 . Canavan’s Case, 733 N.E.2d at 1050 n.6.
118 . People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
119 . Id. (citing State v.  Bible,  858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz.  1993);  People v. 
Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Pizarro,  12 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884 
(Colo.  1993);  Lipscomb,  574  N.E.2d  1345  (Ill.  App.  Ct.  1991); 
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d 311 (1992); State 
v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483 (N.H. 1992); People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 
990 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1992); United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 
1991)).
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United States v.  Porter,  the District  of  Columbia Court  of 
Appeals deemed “somewhat astonishing” the government’s 
proposal  that  the  trial  judge  “severely  restrict  the 
categories of scientists whose views he should consider in 
assessing  general  acceptance.”120 The  court  voiced 
agreement with the trial judge’s conclusion that “[i]t simply 
is not creditable to argue . . . that general acceptance may 
be premised simply on the opinion of forensic scientists.”121
Perhaps most significant is the absence of any opinions 
in which courts take the opposite view—that the “relevant 
scientific  community”  should  be  narrowly  defined.  There 
are two major categories of exceptions to the trend toward 
broad construal of the  Frye  test: voice spectrography and 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).122 In both categories, there are 
numerous  cases  in  which  courts  have  upheld  the 
admissibility  of  evidence  by narrowly  construing  the 
“relevant  scientific  community.”  In  the  DNA  cases,  the 
government typically urged courts to define the “relevant 
scientific community” as those who practice the technique 
in a forensic context; whereas defendants typically argued 
that  the  “relevant  scientific  community”  should  include 
scientists who used DNA profiling techniques in academic 
research. The government generally would argue that the 
“relevant  scientific  community”  consisted  of  those 
individuals  who performed actual  forensic  work,  whereas 
defendants  would  argue that  researchers  who  used  DNA 
profiling techniques in their line of work were well equipped 
to evaluate the use of  the same techniques in forensics. 
Both expert communities were scientists, but one derived 
its  authority  from  its  experience  in  the  trenches  doing 
forensic work, whereas the other derived its authority from 
more traditional markers of academic prestige. In addition, 
issues arose in  forensic  applications,  for  which academic 
research provided no relevant experience. For example, the 
120
1
. United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 634 (D.C. 1992).
121 . Id.
122 . An  oft-cited  “exception”  to  the  principle  of  breadth,  People  v. 
Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1958), is 
not really an exception. In  Williams,  the broader community was simply 
ignorant of  the test under consideration.  That differs from the case of 
latent  print  individual-ization,  in  which  members  of  the  broader 
community are aware of, and do not accept, the claim of the validity of 
latent print individualization.
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issue of calculating the probative value of a DNA “match” 
was one that arose in the forensic context, but not in the 
academic research context;  academic  experts  would first 
need  to  educate  themselves  in  order  to  comment  on 
forensic applications of the technique. The crucial issue was 
whether  the  court  circumscribed  the  “relevant  scientific 
community” narrowly, as those who practice  forensic  DNA 
profiling, or more broadly, as those who generally practice 
DNA  profiling  techniques.  This  decision  ultimately 
determined the outcome of the Frye inquiry.123
In voice spectrography cases, Professors Faigman et al. 
have  shown  that  the  scope  of  the  “relevant  scientific 
community”  determined  the  outcome of  Frye  rulings;  all 
courts that construed Frye  broadly and used no other test 
excluded the evidence,  while  all  courts  that  construed it 
narrowly  admitted  it.124 However,  although  the  courts 
construed the “relevant scientific community” narrowly in 
some  cases,  in  none  of  them  did  the  court  defend 
narrowness as a principle.125 This stands in marked contrast 
to  the  voice  spectrography  cases  in  which  the  “relevant 
scientific  community”  was  construed  broadly.  In  these 
cases,  the  courts  were  able  to  eloquently  articulate  the 
virtues  of  breadth.126 The  conclusion  perhaps  is  that 
narrowness  conveys  virtues  of  outcome,  but  not  of 
principle.
Legal  scholars  also  support  the  principle  of  breadth. 
One legal  commentator has recommended, “[w]here only 
proponents  of  a  technique  appear,  the  court  should  sua 
123
1
. See  generally  Saul  Halfon,  Collecting,  Testing  and  Convincing: 
Forensic  DNA  Experts  in  the  Courts, 28  SOC.  STUD.  SCI. 801  (1998); 
Schwartz,  supra  note  33.  Interestingly, in the earliest cases, it was the 
government  that  construed  the  relevant  scientific  community  broadly, 
bringing in high-powered academic scientists like Kenneth Kidd of Yale 
University and Richard Roberts.  Only when criminal defendants began 
recruiting equally high-powered scientists from the academic community, 
like Richard Lewontin of Harvard University and Eric Lander of MIT, did the 
government seek to narrow the definition of the community.  See  JAY D. 
ARONSON,  GENETIC WITNESS:  SCIENCE,  LAW,  AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA 
PROFILING (2007).
124 .
125 . See Hodo v. Superior Court, Riverside County, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973); United States v. Maivia, 728 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Haw. 
1990); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1975); People v. 
Bein, 453 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
126 . See, e.g., Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978).
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sponte take the responsibility of inquiring not just whether 
the experts believe the scientific community is generally in 
agreement,  but  whether  they  are  in  fact  aware  of  any 
opposing sentiment in the relevant scientific community.”127
B. MEASURING “GENERAL ACCEPTANCE”
Even if the “relevant scientific community” is defined, a 
second  major  ambiguity  in  the  Frye  rule  remains.  How 
should  “general  acceptance”  be  measured  within  that 
community?  Must  there  be unanimous  acceptance  within 
the “relevant scientific community”? Will a simple majority 
do,  or  should  some  sort  of  supermajority  be  required? 
Should all voices be weighted equally, or should some sort 
of  differential  weighting  be  applied?   If  the  latter,  how 
should  weight  be  accorded?  By  academic  prestige?  By 
familiarity  with  the specific  question at  hand? Or,  should 
the  opposite  principle  hold?  Perhaps  the  greater  the 
individual’s  professional  distance  from  the  question  at 
hand, the  greater  weight their opinion should be afforded, 
on the reasoning that they have the least interest in the 
outcome of the Frye analysis.
Although these are thorny questions, courts have not 
had that much difficulty working out some general practical 
parameters. For example, numerous courts have taken the 
trouble to refute the red herring that general acceptance is 
understood  as  unanimous acceptance  in  the  “relevant 
scientific community.”128 But how much general acceptance 
is  required and how it  should be measured remain open 
questions.  Some  courts  criticize  what  they  call  “nose 
counting” or “head counting,” a sort of crude counting of 
implicitly  expressed  “votes”  in  the  “relevant  scientific 
127
1
. Comment,  The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices be Seen and 
not Heard?, 35  MD. L. REV. 267, 293 (1975);  see also James P. Flannery, 
Kara Howe,  & Blanca Dominguez,  Frye,  Daubert,  Donaldson,  and Junk 
Science: The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence in Illinois, CBA REC., 
May 2004, at 30, 37 (stating that “narrowing the pertinent field too much 
would render the Frye test meaningless and ineffective”).
128 . See, e.g.,  Kaelbel Wholesale, Inc. v. Soderstrom, 785 So. 2d 539, 
546 (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App. 2001);  In  re K.T.,  836 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.  App.  Ct. 
2005); In re Commitment of Bushong, 815 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); 
People v. Dalcollo, 669 N.E.2d 378, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Clemons v. 
State, 896 A.2d 1059 (Md. 2006); Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 657 
P.2d 594 (Mont. 1983); State v. Whittey, 821 A.2d 1086 (N.H. 2003).
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community.”129 For  some  courts,  nose  counting  is 
problematic because it entails weighing all opinions equally, 
rather  than  affording  greater  weight  to  the  more 
qualified.130 Others argue that waiting for a sufficient “nose 
count”  will  delay  acceptance  of  cutting  edge  science.131 
Some courts have criticized “nose counting” in the process 
of arguing that a forgiving relevancy test is preferable to 
the  Frye test.132 Others have criticized it in the process of 
arguing  for  their  own  idiosyncratic  admissibility 
standards.133 Still  other have criticized “nose counting” in 
the process of calling for a Daubert-like reliability inquiry to 
replace the Frye test.134
Still,  some courts  and  scholars  have  defended  “nose 
counting.”135 Of all the arguments against “nose counting” 
surveyed above, only the first does not entail the rejection 
of  Frye itself. Therefore, to a court that  does subscribe to 
Frye,  the  only  relevant  criticism  is  the  first:  the  Leahy 
court’s  caution  that  not  all  votes  should  necessarily  be 
counted equally. This would require some sort of weighting 
solution. The  Leahy court argues that weighing should be 
operationalized by insisting that the court “must consider 
the quality, as well as quantity, of the evidence supporting 
or  opposing a new scientific  technique.”136 This  notion of 
“quality”  appears  to  be  something  akin  to  scientific 
credentials or even prestige. In Leahy it was used to require 
129
1
. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 336–37 (Cal. 1994); People v. Marlow, 
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);  Kaelbel Wholesale, Inc., 785 
So.2d at 546; Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1997).
130 . Leahy, 882 P.2d at 336–37; Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31; Kaelbel 
Wholesale, Inc., 785 So. 2d at 546; Brim, 695 So. 2d at 272.
131 . State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 201 (N.M. 1993).
132 . Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1988); Taylor v. 
State, 889 P.2d 319 (Okl. Cr.  1995); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435 
(Wyo. 1993); State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ohio 1983). In the 
case  of  Andrews,  the  call  for  a  “relevancy”  test  would  appear  to  be 
overruled by Florida Supreme Court cases endorsing the Frye test.
133 . Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982).
134 . United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
135 . Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 42 (D.C. 1988) (affirming “the 
focus is primarily on counting scientists’ votes, rather than on verifying 
the soundness of a scientific conclusion,”); , at 222 (“Instead of evaluating 
various scientists’ opinions, a court is only to count numbers of scientists 
within  a  relevant  community  who  do  or  do  not  accept  a  theory  or 
technique.”)
136 . People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 336–37 (Cal. 1994).
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more than the testimony of police practitioners to deem the 
test at issue to be valid.137 This is not really a criticism of 
nose counting, but merely a honing of it. Indeed, it is hard 
to  escape  the  conclusion  that  Frye  necessarily  requires 
some sort of polling of the scientific community if any sort 
of  general  acceptance is  to be ascertained.  In  any case, 
none of these concerns will pose any difficulty for a general 
acceptance analysis  of  latent  print  individualization  since 
both crude nose counting and weighted prestige counts will 
yield the same result.
III. ANALYSIS OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE
 UNDER FRYE
It is established that for most  Frye-subscribing courts, 
the  “relevant  scientific  community”  should  be  construed 
broadly and should not consist solely of practitioners, if at 
all.  It is also established that Frye necessarily entails some 
sort  of  polling  of  the  views  of  that  “relevant  scientific 
community”—call  it  nose  counting  if  you  wish.  How  do 
these principles apply to latent print evidence?  The first 
question  is:  Who  constitutes  the  “relevant  scientific 
community” for the claim of latent print individualization?
A. CONSTITUTING THE “RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY”
Historically,  it  has  been  assumed  that  latent  print 
examiners constitute the “relevant scientific  community,” 
and latent print individualization enjoys high, perhaps even 
unanimous, “acceptance” in this community. However, as 
discussed above, for other forms of evidence, courts have 
generally held inadmissible types of evidence accepted only 
among  practitioners  of  the  technique.  Admittedly,  latent 
print practitioners are more numerous than polygraphers or 
voice spectrographers. However, as one court stated, “Mere 
numerical  majority  support  or  opposition  by  persons 
minimally  qualified to state an authoritative opinion is  of 
little value.”138
137 . Id.
138 . Id.; see also People v. Marlow, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (“[T]he trial court (and the appellate court on de novo review) must 
not  simply  count  heads  but  must  look  to  the  quality  as  well  as  the 
quantity of evidence supporting or opposing a new scientific method.”).
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1. Why Latent Print Practitioners Cannot Constitute the 
“Relevant Scientific Community”
How  can  latent  print  examiners  be  viewed  as 
“minimally qualified to state an authoritative opinion”139 on 
the validity of latent print individualization? This statement 
may seem counterintuitive to some, but  it  can be easily 
understood  by  considering  the  difference  between 
practicing  a  technique and assessing  the  validity  of  that 
technique.  The  question  before  the  court  in  a  Frye 
proceeding is  whether the “proposition” has passed from 
the “experimental” to the “demonstrable stage.”140 In other 
words:  has  the  correctness  of  the  proposition  been 
demonstrated? Knowing whether latent print examiners can 
in  fact  do  what  they  claim  to  be  able  to  do  requires 
performing what is generally called a “validation study.” A 
validation  study  measures  the  rate  at  which  latent  print 
examiners  achieve  accurate  results.141 Validation  is  a 
common process in the sciences by which the ability of a 
test  or  assay  to  achieve  accurate  results  is  measured. 
Scientists  in  a  wide  variety  of  disciplines  are  trained  to 
assess whether instruments of various types are valid. It is 
important  to  note  that  practicing  a  technique  does  not 
constitute  validating  it.  Indeed,  one  can  practice  a 
technique without even being aware of whether or not it is 
valid.  Moreover,  no  amount  of  day-to-day  practice  can 
inform the practitioner of the validity of the technique. A 
practitioner cannot “experience” validity. Validity must be 
measured, usually through a study.
Latent print examiners, however, normally undergo no 
such training. Latent print examiners are trained to analyze 
latent  prints.  They  are  not  trained  to  conduct  validation 
studies, or to perform literature reviews in order to assess 
whether  validation  studies  have  been  conducted.  Most 
latent print examiners have little scientific  education and 
cannot reasonably  be expected  to  understand validation, 
conduct  such  a  study,  or  to  assess  the  quality  of  a 
139
1
. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 337.
140 . Id. at 340.
141 . See  Edward  J.  Imwinkelried,  The  Meaning  of  “Appropriate 
Validation” in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in 
Light  of  the  Broader  Rationalist  Tradition,  not  the  Narrow  Scientific 
Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 759–60 (2003).
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purported  validation  study.  To  be  sure,  this  situation  is 
changing  with  the  entry  of  more  young  trainees  with 
scientific training into the profession, and there are a few 
latent print examiners who are very familiar with validation 
studies.142 Nevertheless,  even  these  exceptions  do  not 
make the community a good arbiter of whether latent print 
individualization has been validated. Because their business 
is  analyzing  prints  and  not  conducting  or  assessing 
validation  studies,  the fact  that  thousands of  latent print 
examiners  accept  latent  print  individualization  is  of  little 
value.143 Evidence  scholars  suggest  that  individuals 
indifferent  to  validation  cannot  properly  constitute  the 
“relevant scientific community”—”The emphasis should be 
on  scientists . . . If  the general  acceptance standard is to 
fulfill  its  objectives,  the  theory  and  technology  that 
generate the evidence must be familiar to a community of 
experts who rarely embrace methods that have not been 
rigorously validated.”144
Professor Jonakait’s characterization of electrophoresis, 
a more technical form of forensic evidence, is equally, if not 
more applicable to latent print evidence:
A forensic  procedure becomes  widespread  not  because  all  the 
people  using  it  have  made  independent  evaluations  about 
reliability. . . .  If  the  new  technique  appears  to  work,  then  the 
methods are taught to others. Since few labs can afford to employ 
only highly trained scientists, often those learning the procedures 
are not scientists, but technicians. Thus, most of those who use 
the  new  tests  have  not  verified  the  test’s  reliability,  and  few 
would have the training to conduct such research in any event. 
The  users  of  the  procedure,  then,  trust  that  the  procedure  is 
reliable, not because they have verified that fact but because the 
developers of the procedure say that it is reliable. Widespread use 
of  electrophoretic  tests  in  forensic  labs  thus  does  not  indicate 
anything more about reliability than that a handful of people have 
142 . Such as Glenn Langenburg of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal 
Apprehension,  who  has  a  degree  in  chemistry  and  experience  in  the 
chemical industry including validation studies.  See Trial Transcript, State 
v.  Columbus, No. 04082599 (Minn. Hennepin County Dist.  Ct. May 18, 
2006) (on file with the author).
143 . See  (“[A] technician’s testimony should never suffice to establish 
the  validity  of  a  novel  technique.”).   There  is  no  logical  reason  that 
Professor Giannelli’s statement should be limited to “novel” techniques, 
and he may have only used it because of the Frye’s novelty requirement. 
On the novelty requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 255–268.
144 .
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attested to their reliability.145
In fact, latent print practitioners would be the subjects 
of properly conducted validation studies of the latent print 
individualization.  It  is  their accuracy  that  would  be 
measured. Allowing latent print examiners to constitute the 
“relevant  scientific  community”  would  be  to  confuse  the 
confidence  of  a  practitioner  in  the  validity  of  her  own 
practice with validity as assessed by an outside observer. 
Latent print examiners’ confidence in the validity of their 
own  practice  is  not  meaningful  because  latent  print 
examiners do not receive valid feedback in going about the 
course of their work. They are not regularly told whether 
they have reached correct results for the simple reason that 
in casework the correct results are not known to anyone. At 
best,  a  latent  print  examiner  might  sometimes  receive 
feedback from a peer who disagrees with their conclusion. 
But if, for example, an error were corroborated rather than 
detected by the peer, neither individual would necessarily 
receive valid feedback about the error.146 Because of this 
lack of valid feedback, the examiners are in no position to 
assess the accuracy of their own practice. Indeed, if asked 
to  assess  accuracy,  they are very  likely  to  confuse  their 
own confidence with actual validity. Much the same point 
has been made about polygraph examiners:  “[P]olygraph 
examiners  are  perhaps  the  group  whose  opinions 
concerning  the  technique are,  paradoxically,  of  the  least 
value.”147 If relevant scientific communities were construed 
merely as practitioners, then astrologers would constitute 
the  “relevant  scientific  community”  that  “accepts” 
astrology  as  valid  and  wine  tasters  would  constitute  the 
“relevant scientific community” for assessing the ability of 
wine tasters  to  accurately  identify  vintages and types of 
wine.
It is clear then, that if the question is the validity of the 
145 . Randolph Jonakait,  Will  Blood Tell?  Genetic  Markers  in Criminal 
Cases, 31 EMORY L. J. 833, 860–61 (1982).
146 . For examples of actual cases in which errors were corroborated, 
rather than detected, see Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for  
Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification,  95  J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 
1023-1025 (2005).
147 . William  G.  Iacono  &  David  Lykken,  The  Scientific  Status  of 
Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 
SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 609, 618 (Faigman et al. eds., 2002).
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technique,  the  proper  scientific  community  is  those 
equipped to assess validity, not those equipped to practice 
the technique.  Indeed, as several  courts have noted, the 
very  purpose  of  the  Frye  rule  is  to  “ensure[]  that  the 
persons  most  qualified  to  assess  scientific  validity  of  a 
technique  have  the  determinative  voice.”148 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court aptly described the virtue of 
Frye  in the following manner: it “require[es] judges to pay 
deference to the conclusions of those who are in the best 
position  to  evaluate  the  merits  of  scientific  theory  and 
technique  when  ruling  on  the  admissibility  of  scientific 
proof . . . .”149 This, the court argues, “is the better way of 
insuring  that  only  reliable  expert  scientific  evidence  is 
admitted at trial.”150
In  addition,  courts  have  expressed  concern  about 
practitioners’ interests, financial and institutional, and these 
concerns apply with force to latent print examiners. If latent 
print  individualization  evidence  were  not  generally 
accepted, it would no longer be admissible in court. Most 
latent print examiners would probably be out of a job. But 
latent  print  examiners’  emotional  investment  is  probably 
even  greater  than  their  pecuniary  interest.  The 
extraordinary claims of “infallibility”151 or “total reliability”152 
that today still  surrounds latent print individualization,  as 
distinct from all other areas of forensic science, make the 
idea that the technique lacks validation particularly difficult 
for practitioners to accept. To accept scientists’ arguments 
that latent print individualization lacks validation may imply 
that latent print examiners had been perpetrating a fraud, 
or at least an exaggeration. It is not unreasonable to think 
that a latent print examiner who had devoted her career to 
this practice would have great difficulty taking such a step. 
This difficulty may be demonstrated by the rather visceral 
148
1
. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000); Grady v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 789 A.2d 735, 743 (Pa. Super. Ct.  2001) (overturned on 
other grounds).
149 . Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d at 1045.
150 . Id.
151 . FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND 
USES, at iv (1985).
152 . Scientific  Working  Group  on  Friction  Ridge  Analysis  Study  and 
Technology,  Press  Kit,  May  18,  2004, 
http://www.swgfast.org/swgfast_press_ kit_may04.html.
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reaction  in  the  latent  print  community  to  scientists’ 
argument that the technique lacks validation.153
The California  Supreme Court  wrote that  to  establish 
reliability  and  general  acceptance,  “[t]he  witness  must 
have  academic  and  professional  credentials  which  equip 
him to  understand  both  the  scientific  principles  involved 
and any differences of view on their reliability. He must also 
be  ‘impartial,’  that  is,  not  so  personally  invested  in 
establishing the technique’s acceptance that he might not 
be  objective  about  disagreements  within  the  relevant 
scientific  community.”154 Latent  print  examiners  violate 
both criteria; they fail to understand the scientific principles 
that have led to differences of view about the reliability of 
latent  print  individualization.  This  is  evidenced  by  their 
consistent  mustering  of  irrelevant  arguments  concerning 
the uniqueness of friction ridge skin, or the use of latent 
prints  in  casework  in  response  to  questions  about  the 
reliability of latent print individualization.155 And, as already 
noted, they are not impartial.
B. MEASURING “GENERAL ACCEPTANCE”
How is  a  court  to  assess  the  views  of  the  “relevant 
scientific  community”  once  it  determines  who  makes  up 
that  community?  One  tempting  possibility  would  be  to 
somehow survey that community.156 There is actually some 
precedent for such an approach. Several surveys have been 
conducted  explicitly  for  the  purpose  of  assessing  the 
general acceptance of the polygraph and social framework 
testimony about eyewitness identification.157 Is there such a 
153
1
. See, e.g.,  ANDRÉ MOENSSENS, THE RELIABILITY OF FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION: A 
CASE REPORT (2002),  available  at http://www.forensic-
evidence.com/site/ID/pollak2002.html;  David  L.  Grieve,  Rocking  the 
Cradle, 49 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 719 (1999). 
154 . People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 530 (Cal. 1985).
155 . See Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 35.
156 .
157 . Not surprisingly,  proponents and opponents of  polygraphy were 
able to archive diametrically opposed results in their surveys based on 
the  way  in  which  they  constructed  the  relevant  scientific  community. 
ALDER,  supra  note   70,  at  256;  ;  Saul  M.  Kassin  et  al.,  The  “General 
Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony,  44 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1089, 1096 (1989) (arguing that “for assessing the consensus 
of opinion on various eyewitness findings” the survey method “is the only 
plausible  method  and  is  far  better  than  other  means  of  establishing 
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survey assessing the state of general acceptance of latent 
print individualization?
1. Formal Surveys
As it turns out, one such survey has been conducted for 
latent print individualization.158 The survey was conducted 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in preparation 
for the first  Daubert  challenge to latent print evidence in 
1999.159 The cover letter makes clear that the survey was 
meant, at least in part, to address the general acceptance 
prong of Daubert.160 The survey did not directly ask whether 
the  respondents  generally  accept  latent  print 
individualization,  but  it  did  ask,  in  Question  #A7,  “Does 
your  agency  accept  the  fundamental  principles  of 
uniqueness  and  permanence  as  scientific  basis  [sic]  for 
using  fingerprints  as  a  means  of  individualization?”161 All 
respondents who completed this part of the survey (forty-
nine respondents) responded “yes” to this survey item.162 
The  survey  was  presented  as  evidence  of  general 
acceptance in the  Mitchell Daubert hearing.163 The survey 
question  should  be  interpreted  as  acceptance  of  the 
premises that make latent print individualization plausible 
but instead has been confused with acceptance that latent 
print individualization actually works. However, even if we 
construe the question as asking about general acceptance 
of the validity of latent print individualization, rather than to 
its premises, should the fact that one hundred percent of 
respondents  answered  “yes”  to  that  question  indicate 
general acceptance in the “relevant scientific community”?
The answer is probably not. In addition to the problem 
of indirectly focusing on acceptance of premises rather than 
on  the  process  itself,  the  survey  suffers  from 
methodological  flaws.  For  example,  the  survey  might  be 
general acceptance”). Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” 
of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts,  56 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 405 (2001).
158
1
. FBI  LABORATORY,  SURVEY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY’S [sic]  FINGERPRINT 
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A DAUBERT HEARING (1999).
159 . United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2004).
160 . See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
161 . FBI LABORATORY, supra note 158.
162 . Id.
163 . Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 241.
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biased  because  it  included  a  cover  letter  that  began  as 
follows:
The  FBI  needs  your  immediate  help!  The  FBI  Laboratory  is 
preparing for a  Daubert Hearing  [sic] on the scientific basis for 
fingerprints  as  a  means  of  identification.  The  Laboratory’s 
Forensic Analysis Section, Latent Print Unit,  is coordinating this 
matter  and  supporting  the  Assistant  United  States  Attorney  in 
collecting data  needed to  establish  this scientific  basis and its 
universal  acceptance.  The  overall  strategy  must  specifically 
address  the  two  fundamental  principles  (uniqueness  and 
permanence)  for  using  fingerprints  to  individualize.  The 
availability  of  the  requested  information  will  not  only  provide 
supportive  documentation  but  will  also  fulfill  one  of  the  other 
Daubert  elements,  i.e.,  that  the  scientific  basis  is  widely 
accepted.164
The letter went on:
The time sensitive nature of these requests cannot be expressed 
strongly enough, nor can the importance of your cooperation. The 
potential impact of the Federal court not being convinced of the 
scientific  basis  for  fingerprints  providing  individuality  has  far-
reaching and potentially negative ramifications to everyone in law 
enforcement.  The  FBI  wishes  to  present  the  strongest  data 
available in an effort to insure success in this legal matter and 
your cooperation is a key component in achieving this success.165
This stimulus does not appear to be consistent with the 
fundamental  principles  of  survey  research.  The  letter 
makes the purpose of the study clear, the desired response 
clear, and threatens dire social consequences (“potentially 
negative  ramifications”)  if  the  desired  response  is  not 
provided. The letter purports that these consequences not 
only threaten the respondents, but innocent bystanders as 
well—”everyone  in  law  enforcement”—should  every 
respondent  not  give  the  desired  response.166 A  further 
biasing effect may have been exerted by the fact that, on 
the crucial Question #7, respondents were asked to provide 
“an explanation as an attachment” if they answered “no,” 
but not if they answered “yes.” This asymmetry creates a 
disincentive  to  answer  “no.”  These  methodological 
164
1
. FBI LABORATORY, supra note 158.
165 . Id.
166 . DON A. DILLMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD 161 
(2nd  ed.  2007)  (stating  that  it  is  inappropriate  to  give  an  “obviously 
biased” explanation of why the survey is being conducted that gives “the 
impression  that  the  sponsor  wants  responses  from  people  who  have 
opinions that are highly supportive” of one particular position in a survey 
cover letter).
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problems make the mutual accusations of methodological 
flaws in the polygraph surveys look like nitpicking.167
But  even  these  problems  pale  in  comparison  to  the 
issue of the selection of respondents. The survey was sent 
to  the  fingerprint  units  of  fifty-three  law  enforcement 
agencies  (the  fifty  state  police  agencies,  plus  the  police 
agencies  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  Canada,  and  the 
United Kingdom).168 As  a method of  polling the “relevant 
scientific  community,”  the  selection  of  recipients  clearly 
leaves something to be desired. The pool of  recipients is 
limited  to  latent  print  examiners.  As  discussed  supra, 
limiting the “relevant scientific community” to practitioners 
allows  a  practitioner  group to  “self-validate”  and,  as  the 
Court noted in Kumho Tire, would fail to bar even astrology 
or  necromancy  from  meeting  the  general  acceptance 
test.169 It is noteworthy that in the case of surveys designed 
to  measure  the  state  of  general  acceptance  of  the 
polygraph,  even  though  various  scientists  waged  a 
strenuous battle about how the respondent pool should be 
delineated, neither side advocated that the respondent pool 
be limited to practitioners (that is, polygraph operators) and 
exclude  scientists.170 The  selection  problem  in  the  FBI 
survey makes the mutual accusations of selection bias in 
the polygraph debate look minimal. Similarly, the designers 
of  the social  framework testimony surveys worried about 
the breadth of their sample even though they did not limit 
their  sample  to  “practitioners”  (that  is,  those  who  give 
social framework expert testimony in court).171
Limiting the recipient pool to practitioners would be bad 
enough,  but  the  FBI  further  limited  the  pool  to  current 
employees  of  law  enforcement  agencies.  Although  most 
practicing latent print examiners, no matter where they are 
employed, probably “accept” latent print individualization, 
those who might have doubts are more likely to express 
those  doubts  when  they  are  no  longer  employed  in  law 
enforcement.172 The  cover  letter’s  insinuation  that  a 
167
1
. See supra note 157.
168 . Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 223.
169 . Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
170 . See sources cited supra note 157.
171 . Kassin, et al., supra note 157, at 414.
172 . This point is anecdotally illustrated by the example of Mark Acree, 
SIMON A. COLE, "OUT OF THE DAUBERT FIRE AND INTO THE FRYEING PAN? SELF-VALIDATION, META-EXPERTISE AND 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE IN FRYE JURISDICTIONS," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453-542 
(2008).
2008] LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY 495
negative  response  to  the  “acceptance”  question  would 
have “far-reaching and potentially negative ramifications to 
everyone  in  law  enforcement”—that  is,  all  the  survey 
respondents’  employers  and  colleagues—only  further 
undermines the trustworthiness of  a survey of  current  of 
law enforcement employees.
Not surprisingly, given these methodological flaws, the 
survey has never  been published or  submitted  to  formal 
peer review. Again, the contrast with the polygraph surveys 
is  telling.  The  polygraph  surveys  (criticized  for  lack  of 
scientific  peer  review173)  came closer  to  proper  scientific 
publication  than  the  FBI  survey,  because  the  polygraph 
surveys  were,  respectively,  published  in  a  non-refereed 
journal  and submitted  as  a  successful  master’s  thesis  in 
psychology.174
One would think that courts would be concerned by so 
poor  a survey that  so clearly  seeks to limit  the relevant 
community  to  practitioners.  But,  to  the  contrary,  courts 
have accepted this survey without any qualms. In Mitchell,  
the case in which the survey was first introduced, the Third 
Circuit ruled that latent print individualization clearly met 
the general acceptance prong of  Daubert  because of “the 
results of the FBI’s survey of state agencies.”175 In response 
to  Mitchell’s  argument  that  law  enforcement  latent  print 
examiners  did  not  constitute  the  “relevant  scientific 
community,” the court drew on  Kumho Tire  to argue that 
“the scientific/nonscientific distinction is irrelevant.”176 But 
Kumho Tire  renders the scientific/ nonscientific distinction 
irrelevant for purposes of applying Daubert. That is, Kumho 
applied Daubert to all expert evidence. There is nothing in 
Kumho Tire that justifies the exclusion of scientists from the 
general  acceptance  analysis.  Moreover,  even  if  Kumho 
renders the scientific/nonscientific distinction irrelevant, the 
problems  with  the  FBI’s  constitution  of  the  “relevant 
scientific community” are greater than the mere fact that 
who identified latent prints for the FBI. Upon leaving the FBI, he has now 
publicly  expressed  his  doubts  concerning  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization. See infra notes 269–276 and accompanying text.
173
1
.
174 .
175 . United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004).
176 . Id.
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law enforcement latent print examiners are not scientists. 
There are also the problems that the FBI’s “community” is 
composed too narrowly and entirely of interested parties.
The  FBI  survey  also  carried  great  weight  with  the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth 
v. Patterson.177 The court found, “[t]his survey is a sufficient 
basis on which the judge could have concluded there to be 
general  acceptance  of  the  theory  in  the  fingerprint 
examiner community.”178 Interestingly, the court made this 
finding  in  a  decision  that  found  inadmissible  a  special 
application  of  latent  print  individualization  called 
simultaneous  impressions.  The  court  found  that 
simultaneous  impressions  lacked  general  acceptance  in 
part  because  of  the  absence  of  a  survey  like  the  FBI’s. 
Although  an  FBI  Latent  Print  Unit  Chief  testified  that 
simultaneous impressions were “generally accepted in the 
community  of  qualified  fingerprint  examiners,”  the  court 
noted that, “[u]nlike his testimony in the single impression 
context,  however,  Agent  [sic]  Meagher’s  testimony  is 
conclusory and unsupported by any evidence, let alone an 
extensive multi-jurisdictional survey.”179
Although  the  court  was  correct  to  find  that 
simultaneous  impressions  lack  general  acceptance,  the 
opinion,  by  describing  the  FBI’s  fifty-three-respondent, 
177
1
. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 24 (Mass. 2005).
178 . Id.
179 . Id.  at  29  (emphasis  added).   But  see Steve  Ostrowski, 
Simultaneous Impressions: Revisiting the Controversy,  WEEKLY DETAIL, Nov. 
5,  2001,  http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/1-99/TheDetail13.htm. 
Interestingly,  a  survey  concerning  the  general  acceptance  of 
simultaneous  impressions  did  exist  at  the  time  of  Patterson,  but  the 
government inexplicably failed to enter it into evidence.  The  Patterson 
court noted that it would have found the survey unconvincing even if it 
were introduced into evidence because the sample was smaller than that 
of  the  FBI  study  (n=18,  versus  n=49)  and  it  found  only  moderate 
acceptance  of  simultaneous  impressions  (ten  out  of  eighteen 
respondents).
At the time of Ostrowski’s (non-peer reviewed) survey, no empirical 
studies  measuring  the  ability  of  latent  print  examiners  to  identify 
correctly simultaneous impressions existed.  (One study has since been 
published.  See  John P. Black,  Pilot Study: The Application of ACE-V to 
Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions,  56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 933 (2006). 
Given that, even under these circumstances, more than half (10/18) of 
latent print examiners were willing to “accept” simultaneous impressions 
illustrates the hazards of allowing practitioners, rather than scientists, to 
constitute the relevant scientific community.
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methodologically flawed, poorly worded survey of a highly 
biased  sample  in  glowing  terms  (“an  extensive  multi-
jurisdictional  survey”),  sets  an  extremely  low  bar  for 
survey-based  evidence  of  general  acceptance.180 
Essentially,  the opinion invites  the government  to satisfy 
the admissibility threshold for simultaneous impressions by 
conducting  a  survey  of  fifty  some-odd  law  enforcement 
agents. Such an interpretation of the Frye rule would allow 
the  government  to  claim  general  acceptance  of  any 
testimonial  claim simply by conducting a survey of  state 
law  enforcement  laboratories.  This  is  a  far  cry  from the 
original  Frye  case in which the court insisted that Marston 
win  acceptance  from  his  psychologist  colleagues  as  a 
requirement of admissibility.
2. What is the “Relevant Scientific Community” for Latent 
Print Individualization?
If the existing survey is not satisfactory,  how can we 
measure  the  state  of  general  acceptance  of  latent  print 
individualization? The problem is unusually vexing because 
latent  print  examiners  appear  to  be  a  non-scientist 
practitioner community. Therefore, the nature of the non-
practitioner “relevant scientific community” is not obvious. 
If a court operating under a deference model wants to avoid 
allowing  a  practitioner  community  to  self-validate,  where 
can it turn in an inquiry into general acceptance? The case 
of latent print evidence would seem to pose a new sort of 
problem,  one  which  has  not  been  addressed  existing 
discussions  about  expert  evidence.  Legal  scholars  are 
accustomed to thinking about cases in which the contested 
claim  has  a  relatively  obvious  appropriate  reference 
community.181 For example, in the Frye case itself, Marston 
was a Harvard-trained psychologist.182 His claims to be able 
to  discern  whether  his  device  accurately  detected 
deception were rooted in his training as a psychologist. It 
therefore seemed appropriate  for  the  Frye  court  to  treat 
180
1
. See 
181 . I  am  grateful  to  Professor  Risinger,  coiner  of  neologisms 
extraordinaire, for his inspiration in coining this term.
182 . Henry  T.  Greely  & Judy Illes  Neuroscience-based Lie  Detection: 
The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33  AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 385–86 (2007). 
See also ALDER, supra note 70.
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psychologists and physiologists as the “relevant scientific 
community”  whose  “acceptance”  was  required  for 
Marston’s technique to be admissible.  This formulation of 
the problem has persisted with regard to the lie detector 
ever since. Although adversaries over the admissibility of lie 
detectors  vigorously  debate  how  the  opinions  of 
psychologists of various qualifications should be weighed—
with opponents of  the lie detector emphasizing academic 
credentials  and  proponents  emphasizing  operational 
familiarity  with lie  detection techniques—neither side has 
seriously  disputed  the  identification  of  psychologists  in 
general as the relevant (or at least the primary) scientific 
community.
Other Frye inquiries have similarly managed to identify 
relevant scientific communities without undue difficulty. For 
example, courts have looked to audiologists, acousticians, 
speech  scientists,  acoustical  engineers,  anatomists, 
electrical  engineers,  linguists,  phoneticists,  physicists, 
physiologists, psychologists, and statisticians to constitute 
the  “relevant  scientific  community”  for  voice 
spectrography.183 Of course in such cases, the parties, not 
surprisingly, may differ as to which academic specialty is 
most relevant. But these are differences between scientific 
specialties,  what  Professor  Brewer  would  call  “extra-
competition of credentialed experts.”184
A Frye analysis of latent print individualization poses a 
different  issue altogether.  The  court  is  faced,  not  with  a 
choice among scientific communities, but with the absence 
of any obviously “relevant scientific community” at all. The 
logic of the deference model is that the “relevant scientific 
community” is the group of people of whom the claimant 
must  convince  in  order  for  the  court  to  find  her  claims 
credible. The court does not exercise its own judgment as 
to  the  plausibility  of  the  claim,  but  rather,  seeks  to 
determine whether the claimant has managed to convince 
the  right  people.  Since  Marston  was  a  psychologist,  the 
right people in his case were primarily psychologists. To be 
sure, Marston might have sought to convince the court that 
some  other  group  ought  to  be  considered  the  “relevant 
scientific community” for his claim, but he would probably 
183
1
. FAIGMAN, FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES, supra note 80, at 296 n.4.
184 . Brewer, supra note 6, at 1633.
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not have been successful. This is because, first, his training 
was  in  psychology—there  is  a  logic  to  requiring  the 
claimant to convince the members of the discipline in which 
he  was  trained—and  second,  because  the  detection  of 
deception is  a scientific  problem that  would seem to fall 
within the domain of psychology.
Adopting this reasoning, it is by no means clear whom 
latent print examiners needed to convince. As Professors 
Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin note, “[w]ith procedures that 
have no application outside the courtroom . . . defining the 
relevant  scientific  field  is  a  major  obstacle  to  an  even-
handed  and  predictable  application  of  the  general 
acceptance  standard.”185 What  the  appropriate  reference 
community should be for latent print examiners’ claim to be 
able to individualize latent prints is not a trivial  problem. 
Unlike Marston and other early  polygraphers,  latent print 
examiners do not emanate from an academic discipline to 
which a court could refer to see whether the claim has been 
“generally  accepted,” nor is  it  immediately apparent into 
which scientific discipline’s domain latent print examiners’ 
claim  should  fall.  Plausible  claims  might  be  made  for 
psychology, computer science, quality engineering, biology, 
and statistics. At this point in history, no discipline has won 
“jurisdiction” over the problem.186 What, then, is a court to 
do? I suggest that the court has little choice but to look to 
the scholarly community as a whole and constitute an  ad 
hoc,  interdisciplinary  appropriate  reference  community 
composed of those individuals who have made a reasonably 
informed effort to assess the issue of the validity of latent 
print  examiners’  claim  to  be  able  to  individualize  from 
latent  prints.  The  court  might  call  these  scholars  meta-
experts,  experts  able  to  evaluate  the  expert  knowledge 
claims of other experts.187 It would appear then that a court 
185
1
.
186 . ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT 
LABOR (1988).
187 . The term “meta-expert” is also used by Professor Brewer,  supra 
note  6,  at  1627.  However,  Professor  Brewer  posits  a  different  sort  of 
meta-expert to solve a less difficult problem. Professor Brewer’s meta-
experts help a judge choose among competing experts “in a given area.” 
My meta-experts are deployed to solve a more difficult situation in which 
non-scientist expert practitioners (who give testimony that purports to be 
scientific) make claims that require evaluation by experts. My notion of 
the meta-expert is also inspired in part by Professors Collins and Evans’s 
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undertaking  a  Frye  inquiry  would  need  to  look  not  to  a 
specific scientific discipline, such as psychology, but to the 
scientific  community at  large.  It  will  be noted,  of  course, 
that most members of the scientific community at large do 
not analyze latent prints,  and some readers may wonder 
how non-practitioners can evaluate the knowledge claims of 
practitioners. It is crucial to recognized that meta-experts 
are  not  evaluating  latent  print  examiners’  analyses  of 
particular latent prints; they are evaluating the question of 
whether latent  print  individualization  has  been validated. 
This  requires,  not  an  evaluation  of  latent  prints,  but  an 
evaluation  of  a  study of  the  performance of  latent  print 
examiners  on  the  task  of  attributing  latent  prints.188 
Similarly,  in  the  Frye  case itself,  the court  called  on the 
“relevant  scientific  community”  to  evaluate  whether 
proponents  of  the  lie  detector  has  amassed  sufficient 
evidence  to  convince  them  that  the  device  correctly 
detected deception. This evaluation did not require that the 
members of the “relevant scientific community” be capable 
of  operating  the  device  themselves.  Their  perceived 
competence  lay  in  their  ability  to  design  and  interpret 
comment that my own native discipline of Science & Technology Studies 
constitutes “expertise about expertise.” H.M. Collins & Robert Evans, The 
Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience,  32 
SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 235, 239 (2002).
Nonetheless. the notion of the meta-expert that I positing here does 
not require individuals with claims to “expertise about expertise,” such as 
sociologists or philosophers of science. Instead, I am suggesting that any 
scholar  who  makes  a  reasonably  informed evaluation of  the  empirical 
issue at hand would qualify as a “meta-expert.”
In later work, Collins and Evans describe multiple “meta-expertises.” 
HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 45 (2007). Most of the meta-
expertises they describe have little to do with what I am describing here 
because they primarily involve using social knowledge to make judgments 
about claims to expertise. Their notion of “downward discrimination,” of 
which “peer review” is the best known variant, comes closest to what I 
am trying to capture here.
188
1
. In the case of latent print individualization, the situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the government has never put forward any 
empirical  study  that  it  claims  validates  latent  print  individualization. 
Haber & Haber,  supra  note  35.  Rather  than critiquing some purported 
validation study, they are simply articulating the parameters of empirical 
evidence that would be necessary to support a particular knowledge and 
noting the absence of any such evidence. Since this amounts to proving a 
negative,  meta-experts  are not able to “prove” the absence of such a 
study.  Instead,  they  can  only  assert  that  literature  reviews  have  not 
revealed any such study.
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empirical studies of performance of a particular task, rather 
than the ability to perform the task being studied.
3. Polling the “Relevant Scientific Community”
A court undertaking a Frye inquiry in 1990 would have 
found  no clear  evidence  that  latent  print  examiners  had 
convinced any non-practitioner scientist of the accuracy of 
latent  print  individualization.189 Today  however,  the 
situation  has  changed.  A  number  of  scientists  and  legal 
scholars  have  evaluated  the  claims  that  latent  print 
individualization  is  valid.  Therefore,  a  court  using  a 
deference  model  can  undertake  to  survey  whether  non-
practitioner  scientists  and scholars  accept  the  validity  of 
latent  print  individualization.  In  what  follows,  this  article 
examines  three  potential  sources  of  information  on  the 
state  of  general  acceptance  of  this  claim  in  the  broad 
scientific  community:  expert  witness  testimony,  amicus 
curiae briefs, and published scholarly literature. All are well-
recognized  ways  of  assessing  the  state  of  general 
acceptance in a scientific community. In addition, all three 
involve acts in which an individual symbolically stakes his 
or  her  scientific  or  scholarly  reputation  on  his  or  her 
opinion. In all three cases, this article examines compiled 
lists of “acceptors” and “non-acceptors.” In doing so, this 
article by no means suggests that courts undertaking Frye 
inquires need always be bound by such crude head counts 
or that the rules for counting that it uses are the only ones 
that could be used. I am by no means suggesting that all 
matters of contested knowledge can be resolved by polling. 
I  am,  however,  suggesting  that  such  polling  may  be  a 
necessary first step for a fact-finder undertaking a process 
of  “practical  epistemic  deference.”  Polling  results  that 
contradict  the fact-finders  intuitions ought not merely be 
dismissed, but would seem to at least necessitate further 
inquiry. Therefore, such head counts may be suggestive as 
to the state of general acceptance. Moreover, there is some 
precedent for such an approach. Litigants have in the past 
189 . Although  numerous  scientists  have  written  about  latent  print 
identification, very few of them have said anything in writing about the 
accuracy  of latent print identification. The few exceptions have merely 
asserted  the  accuracy  of  latent  print  identification,  not  supported  the 
claim  with  any  empirical  evidence.  See  infra  notes  235-238 and 
accompanying text.
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submitted such lists to courts charged with performing Frye 
analyses.190
a. Expert Testimony
Courts  have  suggested  a  variety  of  methods  for 
measuring  general  acceptance.  One  is  through  the 
testimony  of  expert  witnesses.191 The  first  modern 
admissibility challenge to latent print individualization was 
held in United States v. Mitchell.192 Although the hearing in 
Mitchell  was governed by Daubert, not by Frye, the record 
can be used to assess the state of general acceptance of 
latent print individualization.
The  government  presented  the  testimony  of  seven 
expert  witnesses.  Three of  the government experts  were 
latent print examiners with no advanced scientific training, 
although  some  had  engaged  in  a  significant  amount  of 
scientific  self-study.193 All  three  were  questioned  as  to 
whether “individualization, that is a positive identification, 
can  result  from  comparisons  of  friction  ridge  skin  or 
impressions  containing  sufficient  quality  (clarity)  and 
quantity  of  unique  friction  ridge  detail.”194 All  three 
190
1
. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).
191 . Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982) (“An evaluation of 
whether the principle has gained acceptance will often be transmitted to 
the  trial  court  by  members  of  the  appropriate  scientific  community 
testifying as expert witnesses at trial.”); see also 
192 . United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
193 . In  particular,  see  DAVID R.  ASHBAUGH,  QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION 
RIDGE ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY (1999). The other 
two witnesses were Ed German, of the U.S. Army, and Stephen Meagher, 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
194 . Trial Transcript, July 8, 1999, at 37, United States v. Mitchell, 365 
F.3d  215  (3d  Cir.  2004).  The  imprecise  wording  of  this  question  is 
unfortunate.   First,  asking  whether  positive  identification  “can”  result 
elides the fundamental issue of how often such conclusions of positive 
identifications  are  correct.  Because  of  the  word  “can,”  the  witnesses 
presumably must answer “yes,” even if they believe the accuracy rate of 
latent  print  individualization  to  be  very  low.   Indeed,  even  “non-
acceptors” probably would have had to answer “yes” to this question. 
Second, the qualifier “containing sufficient quality (clarity) and quantity of 
unique friction ridge detail” presumably restricts the answer to a subset 
of “comparisons” in which “sufficient” quality and quantity are present. 
Since  “sufficient”  is  not  further  specified,  again,  any  witnesses  would 
have to answer “yes” even if the subset of comparisons that meet this 
condition is extremely small.
SIMON A. COLE, "OUT OF THE DAUBERT FIRE AND INTO THE FRYEING PAN? SELF-VALIDATION, META-EXPERTISE AND 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE IN FRYE JURISDICTIONS," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453-542 
(2008).
2008] LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY 503
answered in  the affirmative.195 This  would seem to  show 
general  acceptance of  latent print  individualization within 
the practitioner community. A fourth latent print examiner, 
who  was  called  in  rebuttal,  had  a  Bachelor  of  Science 
degree,  but  he  was  not  asked  whether  he  accepted 
individualization.196
In  addition,  the  government  called  three  non-
practitioner  witnesses  with  scientific  credentials.  William 
Babler was a doctoral level anatomist.197 Babler appeared to 
“accept” the premises given to him. However, Babler was 
questioned  about  his  acceptance  of  the  “premises” 
underlying  latent  print  individualization,  specifically  the 
uniqueness and permanence of  friction ridge skin,  rather 
than about whether he accepted the validity of latent print 
individualization itself.198 As noted above, the  Frye inquiry 
must be on the technique itself,  not its premises. Donald 
Ziesig,  an engineer  for  Lockheed Martin,  was questioned 
about his  role in  conducting a study using the Lockheed 
automated  fingerprint  matching  system,  not  about  the 
validity of latent print individualization.199 Only one of the 
scientists,  Bruce  Budowle,  a  doctoral  level  biologist,  was 
questioned  about  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization.  In  response  to  essentially  the  same 
question  posed  to  the  practitioners  above,  Budowle 
answered  in  the  affirmative.200 Thus,  the  government 
showed that  latent  print individualization  was “accepted” 
by many non-scientist practitioners of the technique and by 
one non-practitioner scientist.
The defendant presented the testimony of three expert 
witnesses with scholarly credentials and varying degrees of 
practitioner  competence.  David  Stoney,  a  doctoral  level 
forensic scientist, was trained to analyze latent prints, but 
195
1
. Trial  Transcript,  July 7, 1999, at 158–59,  Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 
(Mr. Ashbaugh); Trial  Transcript, July 8, 1999, at 37,  Mitchell,  365 F.3d 
215 (Mr. German); Trial Transcript, July 9, 1999, at 186, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 
215 (Mr. Meagher).
196 . Trial  Transcript,  July 13, 1999, at 53–60,  Mitchell,  365 F.3d 215 
(Mr. Wertheim).
197 . Trial  Transcript,  July  7,  1999,  at  7,  Mitchell,  365  F.3d 215  (Dr. 
Babler).
198 . Trial Transcript, July 7, 1999, at 74, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215.
199 . See Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 223.
200
2
. Trial Transcript, July 9, 1999, at 141, Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215.
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primarily  made  his  living  in  other  areas,  particularly 
microscopy.201 James  Starrs  was  a  Professor  of  both  Law 
and Forensic Science.202 The third defense expert was the 
author  of  this  article,  who  holds  a  doctorate  in  a  social 
science (Science & Technology Studies). Neither Starrs nor 
the author claimed to be able to analyze latent prints. All 
three  defense  experts  testified  that  latent  print 
individualization  had  not  been  validated.  Thus,  broadly 
stated, they did not “accept” latent print individualization.
TABLE 1.  General acceptance of the validity of latent print 
individualization among non-practitioners based on expert 
testimony, c. 1999.
Acceptors
No. Name Title Affiliation Degre
e
Institution Discipline
1. Bruce 
Budowle
Federal Bureau 
of Investigation
PhD Biology
Non-Acceptors
No. Name Title Affiliation Degre
e
Institution Discipline
1. James 
Starrs
Professor The George 
Washington 
University 
School of Law 
and Forensic 
Science Program
BA St. John’s 
University
English
2. David 
Stoney
Director McCrone 
Institute
PhD University of 
California, 
Berkeley
Forensic 
Science
3. Simon 
Cole
Postdoctora
l Fellow
Institute for 
Health Care 
Policy, Rutgers 
University
PhD Cornell 
University
Science & 
Technolog
y Studies
The state of the scientific community at the time of the 
Mitchell hearing  seems to  be  against  admissibility  under 
Frye (Table  1).  Latent  print  individualization  was  self-
certified  by  thousands  of  its  own  practitioners,  but  the 
government  was  able  to  identify  only  a  single  non-
201
2
. Trial Transcript, July 12, 1999, at 37,  Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (Dr. 
Stoney).
202 . Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 228.
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practitioner,  credentialed  scientist  to  say  he  “accepted” 
latent print individualization. Moreover, one might imagine 
that the fact that this single scientist happened to be an FBI 
employee would raise alarms for the court. In contrast, the 
defense  was  able  to  point  to  three  non-practitioner 
scientists  or  scholars  who  did  not  accept  the  validity  of 
latent  print  individualization.  To  be  sure,  the  defense 
witnesses had weaknesses as well. The government could 
have pointed to Professor Starrs’s lack of a doctoral degree, 
or  the  fact  that  the  author  was  a  social,  not  a  natural, 
scientist.  However,  it  would  seem  that  these  objections 
would be overcome by Starrs’s position as a Professor of 
both Law and Forensic Science at a prestigious university 
and  the  fact  that  the  author’s  training  was  in  a  social 
science  discipline  whose  precise  aim  was  to  seek  to 
understand  the  nature  of  scientific  knowledge  claims.  In 
any case, it would seem difficult to see how a court would 
construe this lineup as “acceptance” unless it was relying 
on acceptance among practitioners. Only by excluding non-
practitioners from the “relevant scientific community” could 
a  court  find  latent  print  individualization  generally 
accepted.
b. Amicus Curiae Briefs
One possible objection to basing a general acceptance 
evaluation  on  expert  testimony  is  that  the  numbers  are 
necessarily  small.  Taking expert  testimony is  a slow and 
unwieldy  method  of  gauging  the  views  of  “relevant 
scientific community.” A court might hesitate to rule a form 
of evidence, especially such a venerable form of evidence 
as  latent  print  evidence,  inadmissible  based  on  the 
testimony of  three individuals,  even if  they outnumbered 
their counterparts threefold.
One way of  more efficiently  getting the views of  the 
“relevant scientific community” before the court is through 
amicus curiae briefs. By soliciting multiple signatories on a 
single brief, parties can convey the extent of support for a 
particular scientific  proposition without overburdening the 
court  with  the  testimony  of  each  individual  under  oath. 
Amicus curiae briefs are relatively uncommon in the lower 
courts  that  have  heard  the  majority  of  the  admissibility 
challenges to latent print evidence. However, one appellate 
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court,  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts,  did 
solicit amicus briefs pursuant to an interlocutory appeal of a 
denial  of  a  motion  to  exclude  latent  print  evidence. 
Although three briefs were submitted, two were submitted 
on  behalf  of  legal  organizations.  One  brief,  however,  is 
pertinent  to  assessing  the  acceptance  of  latent  print 
individualization in the “relevant scientific community.” This 
brief was submitted by the New England Innocence Project 
on behalf  of  fifteen scientists and scholars  (including the 
author of this article).203 All fifteen scientists and scholars 
agreed that latent print individualization lacked validation.
The composition of the amici was varied. Fourteen of 
the fifteen held terminal degrees (Ph.D. or J.D., several of 
them held both), the remaining signatory held a master’s 
degree in Forensic Science. The amici came from a variety 
of disciplines: Biology, Mathematics, Statistics, Law, Political 
Science, Psychology, Linguistics, and Science & Technology 
Studies.204 These disciplinary backgrounds reflect the fact, 
discussed above, that there is no single discipline in whose 
domain  the  problem  of  latent  print  individualization 
obviously falls. Contrary to common stereotypes about “the 
academic  brief”  being  signed  by  scholars  with  no 
professional publications or knowledge about the issue at 
hand,205 all but one of the signatories of this particular Brief 
have published articles or given conference presentations 
that deal, at least in part, with the issue of the validity of 
latent print individualization.206  In the  Patterson  case the 
government  was not  able  to  identify  any additional  non-
practitioners  who “accepted” the  claim of  the  validity  of 
latent print individualization.
203
2
. David  M.  Siegel  et  al.,  The  Reliability  of  Latent  Print 
Individualization: Brief of Amici  Curiae  of Scientists,  Scholars, and the 
New England Innocence Project,  Commonwealth v. Patterson, 42 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 21, 21 (2006).
204 . Id.
205 . ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING  
JUDGES, 104-105 (2008).
206 . The  exception  is  Professor  Feinberg,  who  co-organized  a  2005 
National  Academy  of  Science  symposium  on  forensic  science  which 
included  discussion  of  the  validity  of  latent  print  individualization. 
National Academy of Sciences, Sackler Colloquium on Forensic Science, 
http://www.nasonline.org/site/Page  Server?
JServSessionIdr001=wyea1ev6u1.app14b&pagename=sackler_forensic 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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The  Patterson  case  changed  the  general  acceptance 
outlook  substantially  (Table  2).  Although  the  majority  of 
meta-experts had not accepted the validity of latent print 
individualization  even  at  the  time  of  Mitchell,  their  raw 
numbers were relatively  small.  By the time of  Patterson, 
however, the number was significantly larger, which should 
have helped assuage any concerns that the court may have 
had  about  being  misled  by  a  small  number  of  fringe 
scientists. Most of the new meta-experts presumably had 
been drawn to examine the validity claims of latent print 
individualization  by  the  publicity  generated  by  earlier 
admissibility  challenges  to  latent  print  individual-ization. 
Moreover,  while  there  was  no  good  reason  to  treat  the 
Mitchell-era  scientists  and scholars  as  “fringe,”  any such 
concerns  should  have  been  put  to  rest  by  the  time  of 
Patterson. While  determined  advocates  could  always 
impugn the motives or credentials of one or more of the 
Patterson-era scientists and scholars, there is quite simply 
no way to interpret the entire list as “fringe.” Finally, aside 
from raw numbers,  the  trend  of  opinions  at  the  time  of 
Patterson  was  quite  clear.  While  more  and  more  non-
practitioner  scientists  and  scholars  were  supporting  the 
claim  that  latent  print  individualization  was  not  yet 
validated, few were supporting the opposite position. Thus, 
even if  the state of  general  acceptance was clear at the 
time  of  Mitchell,  by  the  time  of  Patterson  it  was  even 
clearer.
TABLE 2.  General acceptance of the validity of latent print 
individualization among non-practitioners based on amicus 
curiae briefs, c. 2005.
Acceptors
No. Name Title Affiliation Degre
e
Institution Discipline
None
Non-Acceptors
No. Name Title Affiliation Degre
e
Institution Discipline
1. Mark 
Acree
Principal Apex Consulting MSFS University of 
Alabama, 
Birmingham
Forensic 
Science
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No. Name Title Affiliation Degre
e
Institution Discipline
2. Robert 
Bradley
Professor Illinois State 
University
PhD University of 
Kentucky
Political 
Science
3. David 
Faigman
Professor Hastings School 
of Law
MA, JD University of 
Virginia
Psycholog
y; Law
4. Stephen 
Fienber
g
Maurice 
Falk 
Professor
Carnegie Mellon 
University
PhD Harvard 
University
Statistics
5. Paul 
Giannell
i
Richard 
Weathered 
Professor
Case Western 
University 
School of Law
MS, JD, 
LLM
The George 
Washington 
University; 
University of 
Virginia
Forensic 
Science; 
Law
6. Lyn 
Haber
Principal Human Factors 
Consultants
PhD University of 
California, 
Berkeley
Linguistics
7. Ralph 
Haber
Professor 
Emeritus
University of 
California, Santa 
Cruz
PhD Stanford 
University
Psycholog
y
8. Donald 
Kenned
y
Professor; 
President 
Emeritus
Stanford 
University
PhD Harvard 
University
Biology
9. Jennifer 
Mnookin
Professor University of 
California, Los 
Angeles
PhD; 
JD
MIT; Yale 
University
Science & 
Technolog
y Studies; 
Law
10. Joëlle 
Anne 
Moreno
Professor New England 
School of Law
JD University of 
Pennsylvania
Law
11. Jane 
Moriarty
Professor University of 
Akron School of 
Law
JD Boston 
College
Law
12. D. 
Michael 
Risinger
Professor Seton Hall 
School of Law
JD Harvard 
University
Law
13. John 
Vokey
Professor University of 
Lethbridge
PhD McMaster 
University
Psycholog
y
14. Sandy 
Zabell
Professor Northwestern 
University
PhD Harvard 
University
Mathematic
s
c. Published Literature
Perhaps  the  most  common  method  of  evaluating 
general  acceptance  is  by  examining  the  published 
literature.207 It  is where scientists and scholars take most 
207
2
.  (“In general, the proponent of the evidence should prove general 
acceptance by surveying scientific publications.  Studies demonstrating 
the validity of new (or old) methods, appearing without contradiction in 
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seriously  the  notion  of  being  held  to  the  arguments  to 
which  they  sign  their  names.  Put  simply,  scientists  and 
scholars  expect  to  defend  the  arguments  they  make  in 
published literature. Therefore,  a court seeking to assess 
the state of general acceptance of a particular proposition 
might do well to survey the scientific literature speaking to 
that  proposition.  Courts  have  indicated  approval  of  the 
notion of  referring to the scientific and legal  literature in 
making  assessments  of  general  acceptance.208 As  Judge 
Altenbernd,  put  it,  “[t]he  Frye standard  is  not  a  direct 
measure of scientific trustworthiness. Instead, it is based on 
the  assumption  that  the  science  will  be  trustworthy  if 
scientists worthy of trust have published articles and made 
public  statements  in  support  of  the scientific  principle  or 
procedure.”209
There is almost no discussion of latent print validation 
in  the  forensic  science  literature.  The  most  prestigious 
forensic journals (Journal of Forensic Sciences and Forensic 
Science  International)  contain  some  material  on  the 
development and imaging of latent prints, on the variability 
of  friction ridge skin,210 on fingerprint  forgery,211 and one 
prominent scientific journals, reference works, or textbooks, are perhaps 
the  best  indicia  of  general  acceptance.”)  (emphasis  added);  Giannelli, 
supra note 10, at 1217.
208 . People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1376 (Cal. 1982) (“[S]cientists 
have long been permitted to speak to the courts through their published 
writings in scholarly treatises and journals.”);  People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 
1240, 1247 (Cal. 1976) (“[A]mici have cited a number of scientific and 
legal articles containing differing forms of opposition to the admissibility 
of  voiceprint evidence.   Such writings may be considered by courts in 
evaluating the reliability of new scientific methodology.”).
209 . Brim v. State, 779 So. 2d 427, 435–36 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000) (citation 
omitted).
210 . See,  e.g.,  Nicole  Egli  et  al.,  Evidence  Evaluation  in  Fingerprint 
Comparison and Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems—Modeling  
Within Finger Variability, 167 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 189 (2006); C. H. Lin et al., 
Fingerprint Comparison I: Similarity of Fingerprints,  27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 290 
(1982);  Cedric  Neumann  et  al.,  Computation  of  Likelihood  Ratios  in 
Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Any Number of Minutiae, 52 
J. FORENSIC SCI. 54 (2007); Cedric Neumann et al., Computation of Likelihood 
Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of Three Minutiae, 51 
J.  FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2006);  David A.  Stoney & John I.  Thornton,  A Critical 
Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality Models, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
1187  (1986);  John  I.  Thornton,  The  DNA  Statistical  Paradigm  vs.  
Everything  Else, 42   J.  FORENSIC SCI. 758  (1997);  John  I.  Thornton,  The 
Snowflake Paradigm, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 399 (1986).
211 . Boris Geller et al., Fingerprint Forgery—A Survey, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
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report  on  proficiency  testing,212 but  essentially  no 
discussion  of  validation.213 There  is  a  short  discussion  of 
latent print validation in a less well known forensic journal, 
but that article essentially conceded lack of validation and 
characterized  latent  print  individual-ization  as  a  “leap  of 
faith.”214
Beyond the general forensic science literature, there is 
also narrower literature on forensic identification, an area in 
which latent prints are an important component.215 Taken 
together, these sources provide substantial literature about 
latent print identification.  But does this literature support 
the case for general acceptance?
One  might  first  question  whether  this  constitutes 
scientific  literature.216 My  argument  here,  however,  need 
not  rely  on  such  unkind  insinuations.  Even  if  we  grant 
journals such as JFI status as a full-fledged scientific journal, 
the fact of the matter is that almost nothing in it addresses 
the validity of latent print individualization, and nothing at 
731  (2001);  Boris  Geller  et  al.,  A Chronological  Review  of  Fingerprint  
Forgery, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 963 (1999).
212
2
. Joseph  L.  Peterson  &  Penelope  N.  Markham,  Crime  Laboratory 
Proficiency  Testing  Results,  1978-1991,  II:  Resolving  Questions  of  
Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009 (1995).
213 . It is perhaps worth nothing that a review in the Journal of Forensic 
Sciences  of  the  author’s  book,  that  makes  the  claim that  latent  print 
individualization has not been validated, makes no mention of the fact 
that the book makes this claim. One might imagine that such a claim 
would be of importance, or at least interest, to forensic scientists. James 
A. Bailey, A Review of Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and 
Criminal Identification 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 476–77 (2003).
214 . David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could Individualize 
Using Statistics?, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC'Y 197 (1991).
215 . The “flagship journal” in this area is clearly the Journal of Forensic 
Identification (JFI).  Other  journals  include  Fingerprint  Whorld  and  The 
Print. In addition, a great deal of latent print practitioner literature is also 
“published” online. Important web sites that post original articles include 
www.clpex.com,  www.forensic-evidence.com,  Fingerprints.tk  (www. 
xs4all.nl/  ~dacty/index.htm),  Ridges  and  Furrows 
(www.ridgesandfurrows.homestead.  com/index.html),  and  www.latent-
prints.com.
216 . The online articles are neither peer reviewed nor subjected to a 
selective publication process; print journals are peer reviewed, though not 
all categories of articles are peer reviewed; and the editorial boards of a 
number of journals have members who are less than fully credentialed 
(the  JFI,  the leading  publication,  has  just  over  half  with  advanced—
master’s  or  above—degrees  in  science).  Many  contributors  are  not 
scientists.
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all in it provides evidence in support of the validity of latent 
print individualization. It contains almost no articles dealing 
with the topic of the validity of latent print individualization. 
Those  few  articles  that  do  address  validity  are 
unsatisfactory in terms of providing support for the claim. 
Some steer around the issue altogether.217 
A  careful  reading  of  these  articles  reveals  that  they 
contain  no  references  to  any  studies,  data,  or  other 
evidence  supporting  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization. In sum, though the practitioner literature 
is substantial and useful for arbitrating important questions 
like  how best  to  image  latent  prints,  none  of  it  directly 
addresses the validity question,218 and therefore, is simply 
irrelevant to the question of whether the validity claims of 
latent  print  individualization  are  generally  accepted.  By 
contrast, the legal and scientific literature cited in note 241, 
does  address  the  question  of  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization, and it is this literature that a court seeking 
to  evaluate  the  general  acceptance  of  latent  print 
individualization should turn.
Anatomical Literature
One category of literature not represented in note 241 
is anatomical literature. Some latent print proponents have 
argued that anatomy is the “science” in which latent print 
217 . A case in point is a recent article written by Wertheim and Maceo 
that mentions validity in its opening paragraph and never broaches the 
topic again. Kasey Wertheim & Alice Maceo, The Critical Stage of Friction 
Ridge  Pattern  Formation,  52  J.  FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 35  (2002);  see  also 
Cole,  Fingerprint Identification,  supra note  35.  In an email,  one of  the 
authors argued that my critique was unfair because the article was not 
intended to  address  the  validity  of  latent  print  individualization,  just 
“biological uniqueness.”  That’s fine, but it supports my argument that 
validity is simply  unaddressed  in the practitioner literature. Instead, the 
article is an extended effort to explicate the “biological uniqueness” of 
friction ridge skin, an issue that, as already stated here and elsewhere in 
the literature, is irrelevant to the validity of latent print individualization. 
See, e.g., Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 35.
Other  articles  simply  declare  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization. John D. “Dusty” Clark, ACE-V: Is It Scientifically Reliable 
and  Accurate?,  52  J.  FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 401  (2002);  Kasey  Wertheim, 
Letter re: ACE-V: Is It Scientifically Reliable and Accurate?,  52  J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 669 (2002).
218
2
. This  argument  is  made  in  greater  detail  in  Cole,  Fingerprint 
Identification, supra note 35.
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individualization  is  rooted,219 and  some  courts  have 
endorsed  this  argument.220 It  is  true  that  there  is  a 
substantial body of literature concerning the formation and 
variability  of  friction  ridge  skin.  Should  this  literature  be 
considered evidence of general acceptance of latent print 
individualization in the relevant scientific community? Can 
anatomists constitute the relevant scientific community for 
the issue of latent print individualization, and, if so, do they 
generally accept it?
Generally speaking, those anatomists who do research 
on friction ridge skin do not concern themselves with the 
accuracy  of  latent  print  individualization.  Their  research 
interest is in the formation of friction ridge skin and, to a 
lesser  extent,  its  function.  At  times,  they  have  offered 
opinions as  to  the  uniqueness  of  friction  ridge  skin.  One 
anatomist,  William Babler,  testified to such an opinion in 
the admissibility hearing in Mitchell. But, neither Babler nor 
any other anatomist has ever offered an opinion, in print, as 
to the accuracy of latent print individualization. This is why 
Babler is not included on Tables 1–3.
Perhaps  the  best  way  to  delineate  the  anatomical 
literature  is  to  refer  to  a  bibliography  of  120 references 
submitted  into  evidence  by  the  government  in  the  first 
Daubert admissibility  challenge  in  Mitchell.  The 
bibliography  was  offered  in  response  to  both  the  “peer 
review  and  publication”  and  the  “general  acceptance” 
prongs of  Daubert.221 It’s an impressive body of literature. 
However,  none  of  the  anatomical  literature  cited  in  this 
bibliography addresses  the  issue  of  the validity  of  latent 
print individualization. Some of the literature addresses the 
formation of friction ridge skin, some of it discusses looking 
for  correlations  between  friction  ridge  skin  patterns  and 
disease  or  behavioral  characteristics,  some if  it  explores 
whether ethnicity can be predicted from friction ridge skin 
patterns, and some seeks to trace ancestry through friction 
ridge  skin  patters.  None  of  this  is  directly  relevant  to 
attributions of  the source of  latent prints  by professional 
219
2
. DAVID R.  ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS:  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY (1999).
220 . Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
221 .  (“there is extensive peer review and widespread acceptance of 
the basis [sic] method of fingerprint analysis.”).
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latent print examiners.
Let  me  offer  some support  for  this  assertion.  At  the 
time of the  Mitchell  hearing, I estimate that I had already 
read  thirty-one  of  the  sources  listed  in  the  bibliography 
through my own research on the history of fingerprinting.222 
I  knew, from having read these sources, that very few of 
them  even  addressed  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization,223 and those that did,  stated that it  had 
not been validated.224 At least one was a history book that 
had  little  to  say  about  validation.225 At  least  one  of  the 
sources  explicitly  eschewed  discussion  of  latent  print 
evidence  altogether,  leading  one  to  wonder  why  it  was 
included on the list at all.226 I, therefore, suspected that the 
remainder of the sources did not address validity either. In 
order  to  make  a  provisional  test  of  this  hypothesis,  I 
selected twenty-seven sources that seemed, based on their 
titles  most likely to contain information about latent print 
individualization.  In this  exercise,  I  excluded sources that 
seemed least likely to contain information about latent print 
individualization.  For example, I  excluded a book entitled 
Handbook of Mathemeatical [sic] Functions, with Formulas,  
Graphs,  and  Mathematical  Tables,  another  entitled 
Statistics,  and another entitled  Evolution.227 (However, out 
222 . SIMON A. COLE,  SUSPECT IDENTITIES:  A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL 
IDENTIFICATION (2001).
223 . For example, some of the better known sources address only the 
formation or uniqueness of friction ridge skin, not the accuracy of latent 
print individualization.  FRANCIS GALTON, FINGER PRINTS (1892); HARRIS HAWTHORNE 
WILDER & BERT WENTWORTH, PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION: METHODS FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS, LIVING OR DEAD (1918); HAROLD CUMMINS & CHARLES MIDLO, FINGER PRINTS, 
PALMS AND SOLES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DERMATOGLYPHICS (1943). For more detail on 
this argument, see Cole, Fingerprint Identification, supra note 35.
224 . MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David 
L. Faigman et al. eds., 1st ed. 1997); I. W. Evett & R. L. Williams, A Review 
of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales,  46 J. 
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 49 (1996).  But see  BERNARD ROBERTSON & G. A. VIGNAUX, 
INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 137 (1995).  But 
this discussion largely elides discussion of validity, concluding only that 
“Fingerprint identification is a matter of expert judgment.” Id. at 146.
225 . IDENTIFICATION WANTED:  DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 
SYSTEM, 1893-1943 (Donald C. Dilworth ed.) (1977).
226 . COLIN G.G.  AITKEN,  STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC 
SCIENTISTS 132 (1995). (“Evaluation of fingerprint evidence is not discussed 
here.”).
227 . I subsequently obtained Evolution. There do not appear to be any 
references to fingerprinting, latent prints, or even to friction ridge skin. 
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of curiousity, I included Grey’s Anatomy, even though I did 
not  expect  that  it  would  have  much  to  say  about  the 
validity  of  latent  print  individualization.)  I  assigned  a 
research  assistant  to  look  up  these  articles  and  search 
them for  any  reference  to  latent  print  identification  (not 
specifically to validity). Many of the sources were old or in 
relatively obscure journals, and my assistant was unable to 
locate  nine  of  the  sources.  (It  should  be  noted  that  this 
search was conducted at a branch of the largest research 
library in the world.)228 To be sure, more diligent searching 
might  eventually  unearth  more  of  these  sources.  In 
addition, if the source was not available in the University of 
California Libraries, we did not choose to entail the costs of 
interlibrary  loan.  But  I  am  satisfied  that  such  measures 
were not necessary as explained below.
Of  the  eighteen  sources  that  were  successfully 
retrieved, only five of them even remotely discussed latent 
print  identification  at  all.  The  remainder  discussed  the 
embryological  formation  of  friction  ridge  skin,  the 
inheritance  of  friction  ridge  skin  patterns,  or 
“dermatoglyphics,” the interpretation of friction ridge skin 
patterns.  At  least  one  did  not  even  contain  the  word 
“fingerprint.”229 Another concerned the formation of skin in 
general,  not  even  specifically  friction  ridge  skin.230 (In 
addition, according to my assistant,  Grey’s Anatomy  does 
not discuss fingerprinting at all.) Of the five that did discuss 
latent print identification, one discussed the identification of 
prints by automated systems not humans,231 and two stated 
The  following  search  terms  were  not  found  in  the  index:  fingerprints, 
hands, papillary, friction, skin, epidermis, palm.
228
2
. The  University  of  California  libraries,  http://libraries.universityof 
california.edu/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
229 . See,  e.g.,  Sumiko  Kimura  &  Tadashi  Kitagawa,  Embryological 
Development of Human Palmar, Plantar, and Digital Flexion Creases 216 
ANATOMICAL REC. 191 (1986).
230 . B.  Allen  Flaxman  &  Paul  F.  A.  Maderson,  Growth  and 
Differentiation of Skin, 67 J. INVESTIGATIVE DERMATOLOGY 8 (1976).
231 . Andrea  A.  Roddy  &  Jonathan  Stosz,  Fingerprint  Features—
Statistical  Analysis  and  System  Performance  Estimates,  85  PROC.  IEEE 
1390  (1997).   Automated  systems  are  used  to  search  for  candidate 
matches in a database, not to determine the source of a latent print. Their 
performance  at  this  task  does  not  determine  the  accuracy  of  source 
attributions made by human examiners. In any case, human examiners 
claim  higher  accuracy  rates  than  the  measured  performance  of 
automated systems.
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that  fingerprints  were  “useful”  for  individual 
identification.232 Only  two  directly  addressed the  issue  of 
accuracy.233 One  of  these  asserted  that  latent  print 
identification  was  “accurate,”  and  both  claimed  it  was 
“infallible.”234 A closer examination of these two authorities 
revealed  no  studies,  data,  or  evidence  supporting  these 
assertions  but  only  ipse  dixit  declarations.  Chatterjee 
declared that “it was proved scientifically that identification 
from fingerprints was infallible,” but offered no indication as 
to  what  proof  this  statement  refers.235 The  only  proof 
discussed  in  the  remainder  of  the  article  was  Galton’s 
purported  proof  of  the  persistence  of  friction  ridge 
details.236 Puri stated that “[i]t is now an established fact 
that  the  science  of  fingerprints  is  an  exact  one  and the 
most  accurate  method of  human identification.”237 Again, 
there was no indication as to what it was that supposedly 
“established”  this  “fact.”  Puri  made  reference  to  court 
decisions that supposedly “show that identification through 
fingerprints  is  flawless  and  infallible,”238 but  of  course  a 
court decision can show no such thing.239 The remainder of 
the article was devoted to the “identical twins” argument in 
favor of the uniqueness of friction ridge skin, which, again, 
invokes  the  fingerprint  examiner’s  fallacy  and  fails  to 
address the validity of latent print individualization.
With more resources, I could go through the whole list. 
232 . S.M.S. Bhalla, Can the Science of Fingerprints Be Stifled by Human 
Ingenuity or Manipulation, 15 J. INDIAN ACAD. FORENSIC SCI. 24 (1976); Ralph M. 
Garruto  &  C.C.  Plato,  Fingerprints,  Palms,  and  Soles:  Historical 
Transitions, 27 BIRTH DEFECTS ORIGINAL ARTICLE SERIES 7, 10 (1991) reprinted in 
DERMATOGLYPHICS: SCIENCE IN TRANSITION (C.C. Plato et al. eds., 1991) (which is the 
work cited in the government’s bibliography).
233 . K. S. Puri,  Do Monovular Twins Have Identical Fingerprints?,  INT’L 
CRIM. POLICE REV. 45 (1968); S. K. Chatterjee,  Origin of Fingerprint Science 
and Its Development During Last 75 Years, 13 J. INDIAN ACAD. OF FORENSIC SCI. 
2 (1974).
234 . Puri, supra note 233, at 45; Chatterjee, supra note 233, at 2.
235 . Chatterjee, supra note 233, at 2.
236 . Id. at 3.
237 . Puri, supra note 233, at 45.
238 . Id.
239 . Courts do not typically perform validation studies. A legal opinion 
cannot provide evidence of validation unless that decision refers to some 
study  or  data  that  does  provide  validation.  For  more  detail  on  this 
argument,  see  Simon A. Cole,  ‘Implicit Testing’: Can Casework Validate 
Forensic Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS 117 (2006).
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However, at this point I am convinced that it is extremely 
unlikely  that  the  Mitchell  bibliography  contains  a  hidden 
gem  that  demonstrates  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization. I suspect that if there were such a gem, 
the government would have pointed it out in  Mitchell  or a 
subsequent case. Therefore, at this  point,  I  am willing to 
take the risk of being proven wrong.
Thus, the anatomical literature cannot provide evidence 
in  support  of  the  general  acceptance  of  latent  print 
individualization.  Moreover,  anatomists  do  not  constitute 
the  relevant  scientific  community  for  the  matter  of  the 
validity  of  latent  print  individualization  for  the  simple 
reason that they have evinced in their published literature 
no interest whatsoever in this question. Anatomists are the 
relevant  scientific  community  for  questions  that  do  fall 
within  their  interest  and  expertise.240 But,  if  a  court  is 
interested in literature that addresses the validity of latent 
print individualization it is to another (largely legal) body of 
literature that it must turn.
Literature on the Validity of Latent Print 
Individualization
A glance at  the  legal  and scientific  literature  reveals 
authorities by twenty different authors or sets of authors 
attesting  to  the  lack  of  validation  of  latent  print 
individualization.241 It  also  reveals  authorities  by  two 
240
2
. Questions such as: How is friction ridge skin formed? What is its 
biological  function?  To  what  degree  are  friction  ridge  skin  patterns 
inherited?  Do  certain  friction  ridge  patterns  correlate  with  disease  or 
behavioral propensities or ethnic groups?
241 . See DAVID FAIGMAN, ET AL, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY §  27-2.3.1,  at  386 (2nd ed.  2002)  (“Woe to fingerprint 
practice  were  such  [Daubert  admissibility]  criteria  applied.”);  Michael 
Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters  
with Forensic Identification Science,  49  HASTINGS L.  J. 1069, 1106 (1998) 
(“By conventional scientific standards, any serious search for evidence of 
the validity of fingerprint identification is going to be disappointing. . . . A 
vote to admit fingerprints is a rejection of conventional science as the 
criterion for admission. A vote for science is a vote to exclude fingerprint 
expert  opinions.”);  James  E.  Starrs,  Judicial  Control  Over  Scientific 
Supermen: Fingerprint Experts and Others Who Exceed the Bounds,  35 
CRIM.  L.  BULL. 234  (1999)  (“Instead  of  meaning  incapable  of  error, 
fingerprint identifications are declared to be infallible on account of the 
uniqueness  of  fingerprints  to  each  person . . .”);  David  A.  Stoney, 
Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 
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authors holding the opposite position.242 These two lists of 
authorities unequivocally strengthen the case against the 
general  acceptance  of  latent  print  individualization 
validity.243
Many of the scholars who produced this literature have 
already been accounted for  in  our  previous two surveys. 
Indeed,  most  of  the  entrants  in  our  previous  two  tables 
produced some published literature. “New entrants” to the 
field are reported in Table 3: those scholars who appear in a 
survey of the literature but did not already appear in our 
327, 383 (H. C. Lee and R. E. Gaensslen eds., 2001) (“From a statistical 
viewpoint,  the  scientific  foundation  for  fingerprint  individuality  is 
incredibly weak.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence In An Age of 
DNA Profiling,  67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001) (“In the case of fingerprinting, 
the  general  rate of  error  is  simply  not  known.”);  SIMON A.  COLE,  SUSPECT 
IDENTITIES:  A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001);  David L. 
Faigman,  Is  Science  Different  for  Lawyers?  297  SCIENCE 339  (2002) 
(fingerprinting  has  “not  been  seriously  tested”);  Paul  Giannelli, 
Fingerprints  Challenged! 17  CRIM.  JUST. 33,  35  (Spring  2002)  (“In  its 
interpretation of  Daubert,  Plaza I  is  a well-written opinion.   Havvard  is 
not.”); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint  
“Science”  is  Revealed,  75  SO.  CAL.  L.  REV. 605,  657  (2002)  (“Having 
considered the various indicators of reliability set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Daubert,  it is evident that at the present time, latent fingerprint 
identifications do not constitute reliable evidence.”); Jessica M. Sombat, 
Latent  Justice:  Daubert’s  Impact  on  the  Evaluation  of  Fingerprint 
Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819, 2825 (2002) (“the result 
Judge  Pollak  reached  when  he  excluded  expert  testimony  concerning 
fingerprints [in  Llera Plaza I] was fair.”);  Recent Case,  115  HARV. L. REV. 
2349,  2352  (2002)  (“Fingerprint  expert  testimony  does  not  survive 
application  of  the  Daubert  factors . . .”);  Lyn  Haber  &  Ralph  Norman 
Haber, Error Rates for Human Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT 
RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339 (N. K. Ratha & R. Bolle eds., 2004) (“no data have 
been collected on how accurately latent print examiners match different 
images  of  the  same  finger.”);  Donald  Kennedy,  Forensic  Science: 
Oxymoron?  302  SCIENCE 1625  (2003)  (Fingerprinting’s  “reliability  is 
unverified  either  by  statistical  models  of  fingerprint  variation  or  by 
consistent  data  on  error  rates.”);  David  H.  Kaye,  The  Nonscience  of 
Fingerprinting:  United States v. Llera Plaza,  21  QLR 1073, 1087 (2003) 
(“As  Llera-Plaza  I  so  clearly  reveals,  this  [the  evidence  advanced  in 
support of the admissibility of latent fingerprint individualization] does not 
satisfy Daubert.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 
20  ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 47 (2003) (“Judge Pollak’s first opinion [restricting 
latent  fingerprint  individualization  testimony]  was  the  better  one.”); 
Tamara  F.  Lawson,  Can  Fingerprints  Lie?  Re-weighing  Fingerprint 
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 65 (2003) (“Currently 
fingerprint analysis is under attack because of the lack of study done on 
the  accuracy  of  the  examiners . . .”);  Tara  Marie  La  Morte,  Sleeping 
Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the Unreliability of Forensic  
Fingerprinting Evidence under Daubert,  14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.  171, 173 
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surveys of expert witnesses and amici. In this table, I have 
tried to include all  scholarly  articles that directly address 
the issue of the validity of latent print individualization. As a 
scholar whose work focuses on the problem of the validity 
and admissibility of latent print individualization, I relied on 
my own research and literature searches to compile  this 
survey.
It should be noted that, like the other tables, Table 3 is 
a table of scholars, not of published works. Scholarship is 
measured as an indicator of the views of the scholar who 
(2003) (discussing “strong indications that the fingerprinting field should 
not  survive  a  rigorous  Daubert  analysis.”);  JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS §  12:15  (2004)  (“The 
assumption of the validity of fingerprinting rests upon law, rather than 
science.”);  Simon  A.  Cole,  Grandfathering  Evidence:  Fingerprint 
Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to  Llera Plaza and Back Again,  41 AM. 
CRIM.  L.  REV. 1189,  1215 (2004)  (“It  is  clear  that  no studies  exist  that 
measure  the  accuracy  of  fingerprint  examiners  when  they  make 
conclusions  of  identification.”);  Nathan  Benedict,  Fingerprints  and  the 
Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints  
Fail and a Proposed Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 538 (2004) (“. . . judges 
have generally  relied on their  instincts  and the long history  of  judicial 
acceptance  of  fingerprint  evidence  to  admit  it  without  serious 
consideration of the science behind it.”); Zabell,  supra note  35, at 178 
(“ACE-V is an acronym, not a methodology.”) (emphasis in the original); 
Michael  Mears  &  Therese  M.  Day,  The  Challenge  of  Fingerprint 
Comparison Opinions in the Defense of a Criminally Charged Client, 19 GA. 
St.  U.  L.  Rev.  705,  745  (2003)  (“Those  forensic  experts  who  have 
examined this issue, as opposed to those whose livelihood depends upon 
perpetuating the misconception that fingerprint analysis is based upon 
the scientific method, have found the fingerprint field to be scientifically 
deficient.”).  Not  all  of  the  cited  quotations  refer  directly  to  lack  of 
validation.  (See,  for  example,  the  quotation  from  Professor  Zabell.) 
However, in all of the cited works, the overall message of the article is 
one of non-acceptance. Moreover, many of the authors (such as Zabell) 
also gave further indication of  their  views by signing the amicus brief 
discussed above.
242
2
. André  Moenssens,  Fingerprint  Identification:  A  Valid  Reliable 
“Forensic Science”?,  18  CRIM. JUST. 31 (2003); Stephen M. Stigler,  Galton 
and Identification by Fingerprints,  140  GENETICS 857 (1995);  Stephen M. 
Stigler,  The Fingerprint  Controversy,  20  ISSUES SCI.  &  TECH. 12,  (Winter, 
2004).   Professor  Moenssens  has been quite  clear  in his  views.   I  am 
including the other scholar, Professor Stigler in the conservative spirit of 
interpreting the evidence in the light least favorable to my argument.
At the same time, I want to be careful to be fair to Professor Stigler.  I 
must confess that I suspect that were the issue presented as sharply as I 
have endeavored to do here Professor Stigler’s views might turn out to be 
more  consistent  with  the  “non-acceptors”  views  than  his  published 
writings  indicate.   But  this  is  mere  supposition  on  my  part,  and  I 
characterize  him  as  an  “acceptor”  here  in  the  conservative  spirit  of 
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produced it.  Therefore, I have included each scholar as a 
single line item, no matter how many works addressing the 
validity  of  latent  print  individualization  the  scholar  has 
produced. This seems the fairest way to proceed so as not 
to allow the counts to be dominated by a small number of 
scholars who produce a large numbers of works repeatedly 
drawing the same conclusion. A small number of scholars’ 
views  were  difficult  to  categorize,244 and  they  are  not 
included in Table 3.
As  Table  3  indicates,  a  survey  of  the  published 
literature further strengthens the case against the general 
acceptance of latent print individualization. A survey of the 
published literature adds two highly credentialed scholars 
to the list of acceptors, but ten more non-acceptors. If we 
remove Mr.  Epstein  and Mr.  Mears  and Ms.  Day,  on  the 
grounds that they have been adversaries in an admissibility 
challenge to latent print  evidence, that leaves eight new 
non-acceptors. It is also important to note that, a survey of 
interpreting the evidence in the light least favorable to my argument.
243
2
. See  also  Jennifer  L.  Mnookin,  Comment,  The Validity  of  Latent 
Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW 
PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008).
244 . Principally,  this  refers  to  the  group  of  scientists  including  and 
surrounding Professor  Champod.   Their  views have  been expressed  in 
numerous  articles  and  a  comprehensive  book:  Christophe  Champod, 
Edmond Locard—Numerical Standards and ‘Probable’ Identifications, 45 J. 
FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 136 (1995);  Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett,  A 
Probabilistic  Approach to Fingerprint Evidence,  51  J.  FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 
101 (2001); CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET AL., FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN IMPRESSIONS 
(2004).  Although  these  scholars  express  confidence  in  latent  print 
identification, they also acknowledge that it has not been validated and 
characterize its conclusions as based on a “leap of faith.”  CHAMPOD ET AL., 
supra at 33. This characterization is consistent with that of Dr. Stoney, 
who  has  testified  for  defendants  in  admissibility  challenges.  David  A. 
Stoney,  Fingerprint  Identification:  Scientific  Status,  in MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE:  THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 55  (Faigman,  et  al.  eds., 
1997). But Champod et al. have not so testified. In addition, they reject 
the concept  of  “individualization,” Champod,  supra;  Champod & Evett, 
supra;  CHAMPOD ET AL.,  supra, which is fundamental to contemporary latent 
print practice, at least in the United States. See Scientific Working Group 
on  Friction  Ridge  Analysis  Study  and  Technology,  Friction  Ridge 
Examination Methodology for Latent Print Examiners, 3 (2002), available 
at  http://www. 
swgfast.org/Friction_Ridge_Examination_Methodology_for_Latent_Print_Ex
aminers_1.01.pdf. Under these circumstances, it does not seem justified 
to characterize these excellent scholars as either “acceptors” or  “non-
acceptors.”
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published  literature  alone  would  be  even  more  lopsided 
than  Table  3  indicates  because  most  of  the  entrants  on 
Tables  1  and  2  have  produced  published  literature.  The 
relative number of  authorities in notes  241 and  242 give 
some indication of what a survey of the published literature 
would look like.
TABLE 3. General acceptance of the validity of latent print 
individualization among non-practitioners not listed in Table 
1 or 2 based on published literature.
Acceptors
Name Title Affiliatio
n
Deg
.
Institution Discipline Publ’n
1 André 
Moenssen
s
Douglas 
Stripp 
Professor 
of Law
University 
of 
Missouri, 
Kansas 
City
JD, 
LLM
Illinois 
Institute of 
Technology; 
Northwester
n University
Law Criminal 
Justice
2 Stephen 
Stigler
Ernest 
DeWitt 
Burton 
Distin-
guished 
Service 
Professor
University 
of Chicago
PhD Mathematic
s
Genetics; 
Issues in 
Science & 
Technolog
y
Non-Acceptors
Name Title Affiliatio
n
Deg
.
Institution Discipline Publ’n
1 Nathan 
Benedict
Law 
student
JD ? Law Arizona 
Law 
Review
2 Margaret 
Berger
Professor Brooklyn 
Law 
School
JD ? Law American 
Journal of 
Public 
Health
3 Robert 
Epstein
Attorney Federal 
Defender
JD Harvard 
University
Law Southern 
California 
Law 
Review
4 David 
Kaye
Professor Arizona 
State 
University 
School of 
Law
JD ? Law Quinnipiac 
Law 
Review; 
Int’l 
Statistical  
Review
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Name Title Affiliatio
n
Deg
.
Institution Discipline Publ’n
5 Tara Marie 
La Morte
Law 
student
JD ? Law Albany 
Law 
Journal of 
Science & 
Technolog
y
6 Tamara 
Lawson
Professor St. 
Thomas 
School of 
Law
JD ? Law American 
Journal of 
Criminal 
Law
7 Michael 
Saks
Professor Arizona 
State 
University 
School of 
Law
PhD Ohio State 
University
Psycholog
y
Numerous 
law review 
articles,  
Modern 
Scientific 
Evidence
8 Katherine 
Schwingha
mmer
Law 
student
JD ? Law American 
Journal of 
Criminal 
Law
9 Jessica 
Sombat
Law 
student
Fordham 
University 
School of 
Law
JD Fordham 
University
Law Fordham 
Law 
Review
At this point, by the most conservative accounting, the 
“score” in the scientific community stands at twenty-five to 
three against acceptance.245 In summary, we can conclude 
that  non-acceptors  have  always  outnumbered  acceptors 
and that the difference is becoming more pronounced as 
time goes on.  As  of  this  writing,  a  significant  number  of 
non-practitioner  scientists  and  scholars  have  expressed 
clear  opinions  that  latent  print  individualization  lacks 
validation.  At  the  same  time,  the  government  and 
fingerprint  community  have  shown  remarkably  little 
245
2
. I certainly recognize the crudity of “keeping score” in this manner. 
It should be noted, however, that for many years a prominent latent print 
examiner web site featured a “Daubert score” in the upper right corner of 
its  home  page  recording  the  number  of  victories  for  latent  print 
identification in Daubert admissibility challenges. Although still in use as 
recently as 2007, the “score” has now been discontinued. See Latent Print 
Examination, http://onin.com/fp/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2008). To see the 
“score,” see Latent Print Examination (via the Internet Archive: The Way 
Back  Machine), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070702092813/http://www.onin.com/fp/ 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2008)
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success at finding any non-practitioner scientist or scholar 
to take the position that latent print individualization has 
been  validated.  The  result  of  a  Frye analysis,  therefore, 
should be clear.
4. Anticipated Objections
As noted above, one of the characteristics of the  Frye 
admissibility  regime is  that  designations  of  the “relevant 
scientific  community”  are  highly  contestable.  One  might 
anticipate that  proponents of  latent print evidence would 
object  to  the  constitution  of  the  relevant  scientific 
community, as I have construed it in the preceding section.
First, one might object that the scientists and scholars 
in Tables 1 and 2 consist simply of paid defense experts 
and that their  opinions are,  therefore, of no value. Some 
scholars  have  argued  that  individuals  with  a  substantial 
pecuniary,  or  even  a  non-pecuniary,  interest,  should  be 
excluded  from  a  properly  constituted  relevant  scientific 
community in a proper Frye analysis.246 One might arguably 
exclude the opinions of up to five members of Tables 1–2 
on  this  ground  because  they have testified  on  behalf  of 
criminal  defendants  in  challenges  to  latent  print 
evidence.247 However,  the  need  to  exclude  these  five 
individuals is debatable because even those scholars who 
argue for the exclusion of interested experts suggest that 
the test should be applied carefully and should only exclude 
experts whose “livelihood,” to quote the Michigan Supreme 
Court, is “intimately connected with the new technique.”248 
Thus,  under  this  careful  test,  it  is  not  clear  that  these 
individuals should necessarily be excluded at all.
However,  even  if  they  are  excluded,  the  overall 
acceptance  picture  does  not  change  because  the  non-
246
2
.
247 . Professor Starrs,  Drs. Haber and Haber, Professor Faigman, and 
the author.
248 . People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d 270, 276 n.24 (Mich. 1986); see also 
Schwartz,  supra  note  33, at 210. The court’s reasoning that “a certain 
degree of ‘interest’ must be tolerated if scientists familiar with the theory 
and practice of a new technique are to testify at all,”  id. at 210–11, is 
supported by the fact that elimination of the five meta-experts who have 
ever testified for defendants would eliminate some of the experts whose 
knowledge  of  validity  issue  is  greatest  and  who  have  written  most 
extensively about it.
SIMON A. COLE, "OUT OF THE DAUBERT FIRE AND INTO THE FRYEING PAN? SELF-VALIDATION, META-EXPERTISE AND 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE IN FRYE JURISDICTIONS," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453-542 
(2008).
2008] LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE ADMISSIBILITY 523
acceptors  still  dramatically  outnumber  the  acceptors. 
Moreover, if the opinions of those individuals who have ever 
testified on behalf of criminal defendants were bracketed, it 
would  also  be  necessary  to  bracket  the  opinions  of 
interested  government  experts,  whose  livelihood  is  far 
more “intimately connected” to the technique than any of 
the individuals who have testified on behalf of defendants. 
This  would  have the  effect  of  eliminating  all  latent  print 
examiners’  opinions  from consideration.  It  would  also  be 
necessary  to  eliminate  two  of  the  three  scholars  who 
support  the  claim  of  latent  print  individualization.  Dr. 
Budowle  is  an  employee  of  the  FBI,  a  law  enforcement 
agency housing the largest collection of fingerprint records 
in the world. Professor Moenssens, though a distinguished 
scholar, was himself a practitioner of latent print analysis.249 
Thus, eliminating “interested” experts would, in fact, leave 
the government in a worse position because the data would 
show that latent print individualization evidence is accepted 
by  only  one  non-practitioner  while  still  not  accepted  by 
twenty non-practitioners.
Another potential objection to the scholars in Tables 1–
3 is that some of them are not scientists. Some scholars 
have suggested that a rigorous application of Frye requires 
that  the  relevant  scientific  community  consist  of 
scientists.250 Many of the meta-experts listed on Tables 1–3 
are legal scholars, some are social scientists, and two are 
forensic  scientists.  Each  of  these  categories  might 
reasonably be deemed non-scientists. Whatever the merits 
of the argument to bracket the opinions of some scholars 
on Tables 1–3 as non-scientists, the argument on the whole 
is unconvincing. First, some individuals who may appear to 
be legal scholars in fact have scientific training. One legal 
scholar on Table 3, despite being a professor of  law, not 
only has a master’s level degree in law, but also a doctoral 
degree  in  psychology.251 Another  law  professor  has  a 
master’s degree in psychology in addition to his degree in 
law, and another has a master’s degree in forensic science 
249
2
. Andre A. Moenssens,  The Fingerprint Witness in Court, 54  FINGER 
PRINT & IDENTIFICATION MAG. 3 (1973).
250 .
251 . Contra People v. Clevenger, 2003 WL 22872446, *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (dismissing Professor Saks as a “law professor” who “does not . . . 
claim to be a scientist”).
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in addition to his degree in law. Second, many of the legal 
scholars  on  Tables  1–3  are  evidence  scholars  and  have 
acquired  a  sophisticated  understanding  of  scientific 
arguments,  methods,  and  procedures.252 Third,  legal 
scholarship is changing; currently it  verges closely to the 
scientific, or at least the social scientific, than it did in the 
past.  Although  some  legal  scholars  continue  to  limit 
themselves  to  doctrinal,  textual  analysis,  many 
contemporary legal scholars deploy sophisticated empirical 
and statistical  analyses.253 Fourth,  given  that  latent  print 
individualization (as opposed to other uses of friction ridge 
information,  such  as  biometrics  or  dermatoglyphics)  is 
almost  solely  used  in  legal,  not  scientific,  settings,  it  is 
hardly surprising that legal  scholars are among the most 
likely members of the scholarly community to take the time 
to develop a reasonably comprehensive understanding of 
the  evidence  concerning  its  validity.  Therefore,  it  might 
reasonably be argued that the legal academic community 
does,  to  some  extent,  constitute  the  relevant  scientific 
community for the question of the validity of latent print 
individualization.
With  regard  to  the  social  scientists  on  the  list,  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  social  science  should  be 
characterized as “science” is a hotly debated one. Even if 
one concluded that it should not, two of the meta-experts 
on the list (including the author) were trained in a discipline 
that might be an exception. Science & Technology Studies 
(STS) is a field of social science that takes science as its 
object. As such, training in this discipline involves a great 
deal of training, education, and thought about what makes 
various  propositions,  theories,  research  programs,  or 
disciplines “scientific.” Individuals with this training might 
be viewed as especially well equipped to assess whether or 
not  a  body  of  evidence  supports  a  particular  knowledge 
claim.
252
2
. For example,  Professor Kaye is  undoubtedly  among the leading 
legal  scholars in the world  in  terms of  his understanding of  statistical 
inference  and  also  commands  sophisticated  knowledge  of  the  science 
that contributes to DNA testing.
253 . See Robert C. Ellickson,  Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical 
Study, 29  J.  LEGAL STUD. 517, 529 (2000); Elizabeth Chambliss,  When Do 
Facts  Persuade?  Some  Thoughts  on  the  Market  for  “Empirical  Legal 
Studies,” 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. (forthcoming 2008).
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Finally, it might be objected that four of the entrants on 
Table  3  were  authored  by  law  students.  It  is  perhaps 
appropriate  to  assign  less  weight  to  student-authored 
publications.  Nonetheless,  the  conventions  of  legal 
scholarship dictate that a great deal of legal scholarship is 
student-authored.  Although  student-authored  literature  is 
traditionally  accorded  less  weight  than  faculty-authored 
material, it is not uncommon for student-authored literature 
to be treated as authority in legal scholarship and indeed in 
judicial  opinions  by  even  the  highest  courts.254 There 
seems, therefore, to be no sound justification for bracketing 
the opinions of student authors. In any case, even removing 
student-authored material does not significantly change the 
overall  acceptance picture. Notably, every single student-
authored  article  on  the  subject  finds  that  latent  print 
individualization  has  not  been  validated.  If  there  were  a 
plasusible  argument  to  be  made  that  latent  print 
individualization  has  been  validated,  one  would  imagine 
that some law professor would direct a student to it, as a 
more  interesting  research  and  writing  project  than  yet 
another article  noting the lack of  validation.  And yet,  no 
such article has appeared. Could this be because no such 
argument can be made? It might perhaps be argued that all 
the legal scholarship finds against validation because that 
is  the only side of  the argument that  needs articulating, 
given  that  courts  have  already  articulated  the  argument 
that latent print individualization is validated. Even if this 
were  correct,  at  this  point  in  history  enough  legal 
scholarship finding a  lack  of validation has been produced 
that a legal scholar or law student could today perceive the 
argument  for  validation as one that needs articulating, in 
the scholarly literature if nowhere else. Again, that no legal 
scholar other than Professor Moenssens has done so might 
suggest  to  a  court  undertaking  a  Frye  analysis  that  the 
argument is not one that legal scholars believe.
As  with  the  elimination  of  interested  individuals,  any 
strict  bracketing  of  non-scientists  actually  strengthens 
rather than weakens the case against general acceptance 
of latent print individualization evidence. Such a procedure 
254
2
. Bart Sloan, What Are We Writing For? Student Works as Authority 
and Their Citation by the Federal Bench, 1986-1990, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
221, 227 (1992).
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would eliminate the vast majority of practitioners, who lack 
backgrounds  in  science.  This  would  leave  the  technique 
accepted only by a small community of practitioners who 
have  backgrounds  in  science  (if  one  wants  to  label 
someone with a degree in science who practices latent print 
identification  for  a  living  a  “scientist”)  and  three  non-
practitioner  scientists.  But  a  significant  number  of  non-
acceptors would remain.
5. Summary
Based  on  the  evidence  assembled  in  Tables  1–3,  a 
general acceptance analysis of latent print individualization 
evidence under Frye should be an easy case. As long as a 
court  resists  the  temptation  to  allow  the  practitioner 
community to self-validate its own knowledge claims, the 
picture  is  quite  clear.  The  acceptors  include  only  three 
scholars,  two  of  whose  opinions  arguably  should  be 
eliminated  because  they  are  too  closely  interested.  The 
non-acceptors, however, include more than twenty scholars 
from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives. While various 
criticisms might be made of various individuals among the 
non-acceptors,  none applies to all  of  them, not even the 
criticism  of  not  being  practitioners.  In  their  totality,  this 
group wields  a  high  degree  of  academic  firepower:  they 
include two members of the National Academy of Science, 
one of the most prestigious honors bestowed in scientists in 
the United States, the former President of one of the top 
five research universities in the United States, and some of 
the legal academy’s most eminent evidence scholars. They 
include  four  Harvard  degrees,  (the  “acceptor”  group 
includes  one).  Although  the  motives  or  qualifications  of 
some  of  these  individuals  may  be  impugned,  even  the 
elimination from consideration of a couple of them leaves 
the opinions of some of the others standing. The point here 
is  that  the  weight  of  scholarly  opinion  seems  to  be 
approaching  very  closely,  despite  all  personal  and 
disciplinary  differences,  a  common conclusion  that  latent 
print  individualization  lacks  validation.  This  degree  of 
consensus, it would seem, is precisely what the notion of 
“general acceptance in the relevant scientific community” 
was intended to capture.
None of this is to suggest that courts must, as a general 
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rule,  deem propositions  unaccepted  every  time  they  are 
presented  with  a  petition  containing  the  signature  of 
twenty-five people with advanced degrees, or that degrees 
from  fancy  universities  should  automatically  connote 
authority. Deference to scientists and scholars must surely 
be  exercised  with  caution.  However,  in  this  case,  the 
totality of evidence of non-acceptance, combined with the 
failure  of  the  proponents  of  the  evidence  to  attract  any 
significant support from any informed observers outside the 
practitioner community would seem to be a situation that 
should make a court very uncomfortable about deeming the 
evidence “generally accepted.”
C. NON-NOVELTY
A  common  argument  holds  that  the  Frye test  only 
applies to “novel” expert evidence. Therefore, it is argued, 
even  if  latent  print  individualization  would  fail  a  general 
acceptance  analysis,  it  would  not  reach  that  analysis 
because it is not novel evidence. Since Frye postdated the 
introduction of latent print evidence to U.S. courts by more 
than two decades,255 this view would find that latent print 
evidence was never properly the subject of  Frye analysis. 
The supposed non-novelty loophole has probably been one 
of the chief deterrents to admissibility challenges to latent 
print evidence under Frye.
In fact, the non-novelty loophole should not be treated 
as  an  obstacle  to  challenging  the  admissibility  of  latent 
print evidence under Frye. First, the notion that Frye limited 
itself to novel evidence is a myth. The Frye opinion contains 
no reference to novelty. Instead, it has been suggested that 
the notion  that  Frye  is  limited to  novel  evidence can be 
traced to a law professor.256
It is true that some state courts appear to have added a 
“novelty” requirement in their cases adopting Frye.257 Other 
255
2
. See People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Ill. 1911).
256 . See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, 299 (2004); 
James E.  Starrs,  Frye v.  United States Restructured and Revitalized:  A 
Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 252–53 
(1986).
257 . See, e.g., Still v. State, 917 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); 
Dirling v. Sarasota County Gov’t, 871 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2004); 
State v. Sercey, 825 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); U.S. Sugar Corp. 
v.  Henson,  No.  1D99-27982000,  2000 WL 1880340 (Fla.  Dist.  Ct.  App. 
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courts have rejected the novelty requirement.258 But even 
some  courts  with  a  novelty  requirement,  such  as  the 
California Supreme Court,  have interpreted it to refer not 
merely  to  new  techniques,  but  also  to  new  information 
about the general acceptance, or even reliability, of even 
time-honored  techniques.  People  v.  Kelly  states  that  the 
non-novelty  loophole  remains  open  only  “until  new 
evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of 
the scientific  community.”259 Clearly,  as  demonstrated by 
the  above  discussion,  infra  Part  ,  the  attitude  of  the 
scientific community has been developing rapidly over the 
last decade. A litigant could demonstrate the existence of 
such new information,  as  explicated  above,  and such  an 
interpretation would, therefore, allow a  Frye  challenge to 
latent print individualization evidence. Legal scholars agree 
that “the ‘novelty’ requirement should not bar relitigation if 
the  scientific  community  changes  its  mind  when  further 
research  reveals  that  a  previously  trusted  technique  no 
longer is valid.”260 This is precisely the case for latent print 
evidence. Indeed, the courts’  openness to “new evidence 
reflecting  a  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  scientific 
community” is particularly pertinent to the case of latent 
print evidence where only the publicity generated by earlier 
admissibility  challenges  drew  the  attention  of  the 
mainstream  scientific  community  to  the  issue  of  its 
Dec. 29, 2000); State v. Meador, 674 So. 2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); 
People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976), rev’d on other grounds; 
In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. 2004); Donaldson v. 
Cent.  Ill.  Pub. Serv. Co.,  767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill.  2002),  abrogated on 
other grounds; People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2000); In re Marriage of 
Alexander, 857 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. 5th 2006); People v. Cumbee, 851 
N.E.2d 934 (Ill.  App. 2d. 2006);  In re K.T., 836 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.  App. 3d 
2005); In re Commitment of Bushong, 815 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. App. 2d 2004); 
People v. Canulli, 792 N.E.2d 438 (Ill. App. 4th 2003); Owens Corning v. 
Bauman,  726 A.2d 745,  767 (Md.  Ct.  Spec.  App.  1999),  abrogated on 
other grounds.
258
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. See,  e.g., Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 408 
(Mich. 2004).
259 . Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1245; see also Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 
891 (Colo. 1993).
260 .  John William Strong,  Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: 
Limiting  Expert  Testimony  by  Restrictions  of  Function,  Reliability,  and 
Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367 (1992) (“no apparent reason exists . . . for 
limiting the standard to ‘novel’ scientific evidence”).
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validity.261 Finally,  to the extent that  courts do enforce a 
non-novelty  loophole,  they  defy common sense,  as  legal 
scholars have pointed out.262
D. NONSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Another “loophole” in Frye is that many courts refuse to 
apply it to “nonscientific” evidence.263 Should this be a bar 
to subjecting latent print evidence to  Frye? It would seem 
not.  The rationale  for  applying the  Frye  test  to scientific 
evidence  is  that  “it  is  widely  agreed  that  propositions 
perceived as ‘scientific’  by the jury possess an unusually 
high degree of persuasive power.”264 Arguably, nonscientific 
evidence  that  does  not  enjoy  the  extra  degree  of 
persuasive power associated with “science,” need not bear 
the burden of a Frye inquiry. But, while the issue of whether 
latent  print  individualization  truly  is  or  is  not  properly 
characterized  as  “science”  is  a  contested  and  vexing,265 
there can be little doubt that it is presented to the jury as 
“science.” Therefore, it should be required to meet the Frye 
261
2
. Andy Newman,  Fingerprinting’s  Reliability  Draws  Growing Court 
Challenges,  N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A8; Andy Newman,  Judge Rules 
Fingerprints Cannot Be Called a Match,  N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at A14; 
Seth Stern, A Harder Day in Court for Fingerprint, Writing Experts, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 2002, at 2; Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie?, NEW 
YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 96; David L. Faigman,  Is Science Different for 
Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339 (2002); Adrian Cho, Fingerprinting Doesn’t Hold 
Up  as  a  Science  in  Court,  295  SCIENCE 418  (2002);  Shannon  P.  Duffy, 
Philadelphia  Judge  Reverses  Landmark  Fingerprint  Decision,  LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 14, 2003; Michael Higgins,  Fingerprint Evidence Put on 
Trial, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 2002, at 1; Giannelli, supra note 241, at 33; Mike 
Weiss, U.S. Judge Challenges ‘Science’ of Fingerprints, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 
24, 2002, at A1; Edward Lazarus, Why Judges Rarely Change Their Minds, 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/August, 2002, at 39.
262 .
263 . Strong,  supra note  260,  at  367;  Edward  J.  Imwinkelried,  The 
Escape Hatches from  Frye and  Daubert: Sometimes You Don’t Need to 
Lay Either Foundation in order to Introduce Expert Testimony!, 23  AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1999).
264 . Strong, supra note 260, at 367.
265 . Michele Triplett & Lauren Cooney,  The Etiology of ACE-V and its 
Proper Use: An Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V and the  
Scientific  Method  of  Hypothesis  Testing,  56  J.  FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 345 
(2006); André Moenssens, Is Fingerprint Identification a “Science”?, http:// 
www.forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/ID00004_2.html  (last  visited Mar.  15, 
2008);  Bernard  W.N.  Robertson,  Fingerprints,  Relevance  and 
Admissibility, 2 N.Z. RECENT L. REV. 252, 256 (1990) (“Fingerprint ‘experts’ 
are in fact technicians and not scientists.”).
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standard.  As  Professor  Strong  put  it,  “[p]ropositions 
possessing significantly increased potential to influence the 
trier of fact as ‘scientific’ assertions should be required to 
meet scientific standards of reliability.”266
IV. FRYE RULINGS
Astonishingly,  until  2007  there  was  no  ruling  that 
explicitly  considered  the  admissibility  of  latent  print 
individualization evidence under Frye.  As discussed above, 
this  glaring  lacuna  was  probably  due  to  several  factors 
including the non-novelty loophole and the defense bar’s 
assumption that such challenges were only plausible under 
Daubert.  There  have,  however,  been  some  admissibility 
rulings  in  Daubert  or  mixed  jurisdictions  that  have 
considered the issue of  the general  acceptance of  latent 
print individualization.
Many courts have reasoned that latent print evidence 
satisfies the general acceptance requirement by restricting 
the relevant community to fingerprint examiners or to the 
forensic community.267 Some courts have relied exclusively 
on  general  acceptance  to  find  latent  print  evidence 
admissible under Daubert.268
266
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. Strong, supra note 260, at 368.
267 . See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. 
Ky.  2003)  (“The  court  finds  that  ACE-V  is  generally  accepted  in  the 
fingerprint analysis and forensic science fields . . . .”). While it would be 
difficult to dispute this assertion as it concerns fingerprint examiners, it is 
far  less  clear  that  it  is  accurate  as  it  concerns  the  field  of  “forensic 
science” more generally. In any case, although the court noted that “[t]he 
plaintiff’s  expert,  Joy  Younce,  testified  that  ACE-V  is  the  standard 
methodology used by fingerprint examiners in analyzing fingerprints,” id. 
(emphasis  added),  the court  refers  to  no evidence about  the  state  of 
general acceptance among forensic scientists.  See also United States. v. 
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Collins, 340 
F.3d  672,  682  (8th  Cir.  2003)  (“Fingerprint  evidence  and  analysis  is 
generally accepted.”); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d. 261, 268 (4th Cir. 
2003) (“While the principles underlying fingerprint identification have not 
attained the status of scientific law, they nonetheless bear the imprimatur 
of a strong general acceptance, not only in the expert community, but in 
the courts as well.”); United States v. Abreu 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th 
Cir. 2005).
268 . Michael J. Saks,  Reliability Standards: Too High, Too Low, or Just  
Right? The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science (Especially 
Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1181 (2003).
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A. COMMONWEALTH V. PATTERSON
Perhaps  the  most  extended  discussion  of  general 
acceptance can be found in the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts’s  ruling  in  Commonwealth  v.  Patterson.269 
The case was an unusual one in that it dealt both with the 
admissibility  of  latent  print  individualization  testimony  in 
general  and  with  a  particular  application  known  as 
“simultaneous  impressions.”270 Massachusetts  is  a  mixed 
Frye-Daubert  jurisdiction,  but  the  decision  in  Patterson 
relied heavily on general acceptance. The court began by 
acknowledging  that  its  own  ruling  in  Canavan’s  Case271 
mandated  that  the  relevant  scientific  community  “be 
defined  broadly  enough  to  include  a  sufficiently  broad 
sample of scientists so that the possibility of disagreement 
exists,”  not  “so  narrowly  that  the  expert’s  opinion  will 
inevitably be considered generally accepted.”272 This would 
seem to  clearly  call  for  extending  the  relevant  scientific 
community beyond the narrow confines of practitioners.
At one point, the court appeared to claim that there are 
some “scientists” who accept latent print individualization, 
naming  one:  Professor  Babler.273 But,  as  the  court 
acknowledged,  and  I  noted  above,  Babler’s  research 
concerns  “the  underlying  premises  of  fingerprint 
examination,”  not  the  validity  of  latent  print 
individualization.274 Indeed,  as  the court  did  not mention, 
Babler  has  never  made  any  statement  concerning  the 
269
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. 840 N.E.2d 12 (Mass. 2005).
270 . The  details  of  simultaneous  impression  identification  need  not 
concern us  here,  but  it  consists  of  aggregating consistent  ridge detail 
from  multiple  latent  prints  when  no  one  of  those  latent  prints  has 
“sufficient”  (“sufficiency”  being  an  undefined  concept  in  latent  print 
analysis) ridge detail for identification.  Such aggregation is, of course, 
only legitimate if it is known that the latent prints were laid down by a 
single  hand—that  is,  “simultaneously”  and  not  by  different  hands  at 
different  times.   The  ability  of  latent  print  examiners  to  distinguish 
between  simultaneous  and  non-simultaneous  sets  of  latent  prints  had 
never been measured at the time Patterson was decided, though one pilot 
study has now been conducted. John P. Black, Pilot Study: The Application 
of ACE-V to Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions,  56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 
933 (2006).
271 . 733 N.E.2d 1042 (Mass. 2000).
272 . Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 25.
273 . Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 24 n. 12.
274 . Id.
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validity or accuracy of latent print individualization.
In the final analysis, the court did not rely on Babler, 
but instead simply excluded all scientists from the relevant 
community  altogether  and  limited  the  community  to 
practitioners. Directly after acknowledging its own call for 
breadth in Canavan’s Case, the court then said:
The  judge  properly  ensured  that  the  technical  community  in 
which  latent  fingerprint  identification  and  ACE-V  is  generally 
accepted  is  broad  enough  to  include  ‘some  practitioners who 
acknowledge flaws in the methodology’ and tolerant enough to 
allow ‘some, albeit, limited room for dissent.’275
Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the trial  court’s 
finding “that both latent fingerprint identification theory in 
general  and  the  ACE-V  methodology  in  particular  are 
generally accepted in the fingerprint examiner community” 
because of “the unanimous and long-standing acceptance 
of  latent  fingerprint  identification  theory.”276 In  upholding 
the  trial  court’s  finding  of  “unanimous”  acceptance,  the 
Supreme Court not only sanctioned the exclusion of all non-
practitioners from the “relevant scientific community,” but 
also the exclusion of even those practitioners who dared to 
doubt that the validity of latent print individualization had 
been established, such as Mr. Acree, a latent print examiner 
who  signed  the  amicus  curiae brief.277 (discussed  supra, 
Part  .  Thus,  the  court’s  designation  of  the  “relevant 
scientific  community”  was  not  really  disciplinary,  but 
merely  ideological.  Mr.  Acree  was  presumably  excluded 
from  the  relevant  scientific  community  not  because  he 
wasn’t a practitioner—he was—but merely because he held 
the “wrong” opinion.
However, the court went on to rule that the trial court 
did  abuse its discretion in admitting latent print evidence 
concerning simultaneous impressions. The government did 
not  make  a  sufficient  showing  that  simultaneous 
impressions were generally accepted within even the latent 
print  practitioner  community.  But,  even  in  excluding 
simultaneous impressions, the court emphasized its narrow 
definition of the relevant scientific community. It explicitly 
noted that it is the fingerprint community, not the broader 
275
2
. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
276 . Id. at 20.
277 . See Part III. B. 3. b. supra.
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scientific  community,  whose  “general  acceptance”  would 
be necessary to render simultaneous impression evidence 
admissible:  “if  the  Commonwealth  establishes  that  the 
application  of  ACE-V  to  simultaneous  impressions  is 
generally accepted in the fingerprint examiner community, 
the evidence is properly admitted.”278
As evidence of its claim that the practitioner community 
was “broad” in and of itself, the court offered the following: 
first,  “the  guidelines  and  standards  developed  by  the 
Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study 
and  Technology  (SWGFAST)  committees  are  subject  to 
repeated  discussion,  critique,  and  debate  by  the  entire 
SWGFAST  community  and  by  members  of  the  IAI 
[International  Association  for  Identification].”279 Second, 
“[a]dditional  room  for  disagreement  lies  in  the  ongoing 
debate  over  how  many  points  of  similarity,  if  any,  are 
needed to conclusively make a match.”280 Third, the court 
noted that some latent print examiners disapprove of the 
use of simultaneous impressions, the application of latent 
print analysis at issue in Patterson.281
The first assertion is, of course, laughable because the 
court  has,  in  its  very  articulation  of  the  latent  print 
community’s  supposed  “breadth”  and  “tolerance”  for 
dissent,  acknowledged  that  it  is  in  fact  quite  clearly  a 
closed  community  whose  doctrines  are  not  open  to 
discussion  by  those  who  are  not  either  members  of  the 
professional  organization  or  to  an  elite  appointed  body, 
convened by the FBI, that seeks to set voluntary practice 
guidelines for the profession (SWGFAST). The second two 
assertions speak to matters of debate within the profession 
(the  number  of  points  necessary  to  establish  an 
individualization  and  the  appropriateness  of 
individualization from simultaneous impressions), but not to 
the  fundamental  validity  of  latent  print  individualization 
itself.
The court conflates a discipline’s commitment to robust 
internal debate within the community with the discipline’s 
ability  to  achieve  “external  validation”—to  convince 
278
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. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 29 (emphasis added).
279 . Id.  (emphasis added).
280 . Id.
281 . Id.
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qualified  outsiders  that  the  discipline’s  claims  are  true. 
Certainly,  a  court  should  want  to  find  robust  internal 
criticism  within  any  expert  community  seeking  to  offer 
evidence  in  court.  Classically  believed  to  be  an 
indispensable  attribute  of  a  healthy  scientific  community 
(or,  for  that  matter,  any  community  devoted  to  rational 
inquiry whether or not it calls itself “science”), this sort of 
open inquiry is supposed to encourage the rigorous testing 
of ideas and help eliminate weak claims.282 However, while 
internal criticism may be necessary for admissibility under 
Frye,  it  is  not  sufficient.  Astrologers  could  make  an 
persuasive showing of  robust internal  debate by showing 
that  astrologers  disagree  as  to  what  particular  practices 
should  be  used  to  answer  particular  questions,  what 
particular  astrological  techniques  should  be  used  under 
what circumstances,  how to interpret  various astrological 
signs,  and  so  on.  But,  astrologers  cannot  demonstrate 
external  validity.  They  have  not  convinced  qualified 
outsiders—scientists—that the discipline’s claims are true. 
In Patterson, the court was able to find evidence of robust 
internal  debate,  but  it  was  able  to  find  no  evidence  of 
external  validation.283 The  court  then  fundamentally 
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changed the meaning of the “breadth” principle. Whereas 
all  the  previous  discussions  of  “breath,”  including  the 
court’s  own,  conceive  of  breadth  as  extending  the 
discussion  beyond  the  practitioner  community  to  the 
scientific community, in Patterson breadth has come to be 
defined  by  “tolerance”  for  dissenting  views  within  the 
practitioner community itself.
Even if the court did find that robust internal criticism 
could substitute for external validation, what is remarkable 
is how underwhelming was the court’s endorsement of the 
latent print community’s adherence to this ideal of robust 
internal  criticism.  Far  from  finding  a  resounding 
commitment  to  open inquiry,  the  court  characterizes  the 
latent print community as allowing only “limited room for 
dissent.” This rather lukewarm characterization raises more 
questions than it  answers.  What,  precisely,  did  the court 
mean when it said that room for dissent is “limited” in the 
latent  print  practitioner  community?  If  it  is  a  scientific 
community,  or  even  a  non-scientific  professional 
community,  why  is  room  for  dissent  “limited”?  If  it  is  a 
community that serves the interests of justice, why is room 
for dissent “limited”? Why, if fingerprinting is as clear cut, 
as accurate, indeed as “infallible” as its proponents claim, 
is  there  a  need  to  “limit”  dissent  in  the  practitioner 
community  anyway?  And,  if  latent  print  examiners 
constitute a community that limits dissent, wouldn’t that be 
all  the  more  reason  to  weigh  heavily  the  opinions  of 
outsiders and not allow such a community to constitute a 
self-certifying  “relevant  technical  community”?  Isn’t  the 
suspicion that a community limits dissent precisely the sort 
of situation that necessitates broadening the field of inquiry 
in the general acceptance analysis?
Perhaps, in using the term “limited room for dissent,” 
the court had in mind some of the statements from latent 
print  practitioners  themselves  that  may  be  found  in  the 
exhibits submitted in the  Patterson  case,  attesting to the 
prevalence of “dogma” and a “cultish demeanor” within the 
latent  print  community. Perhaps  it  had  in  mind  Mr. 
Ashbaugh’s statement:
In the past the friction ridge identification science has been akin 
to  a  divine  following.  Challenges  were  considered  heresy  and 
challengers frequently were accused of chipping at the foundation 
SIMON A. COLE, "OUT OF THE DAUBERT FIRE AND INTO THE FRYEING PAN? SELF-VALIDATION, META-EXPERTISE AND 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF LATENT PRINT EVIDENCE IN FRYE JURISDICTIONS," 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453-542 
(2008).
536 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
of the science unnecessarily. This cultish demeanor was fostered 
by a general  deficiency of  scientific  knowledge,  understanding, 
and self-confidence within the ranks of identification specialists. A 
pervading fear  developed  in which any negative aspect  voiced 
that did not support the concept of an exact and infallible science 
could lead to its destruction and the destruction of the credibility 
of those supporting it.284
Or perhaps this:
The failure of the identification community to challenge or hold 
meaningful debate can also be partly attributed to the fact that 
the friction ridge identification science has been basically under 
the  control  of  the  police  community  rather  than  the  scientific 
community.  In  the  eyes  of  many police  administrators,  friction 
ridge identification is a tool for solving crime, a technical function, 
as opposed to a forensic science.285
Or perhaps it had in mind the following statement by Mr. 
Grieve,  long  the  editor  of  the  Journal  of  Forensic 
Identification:
[T]his  categorical  requirement  of  absolute  certainty  has  no 
particular  scientific  principle  but  has  evolved  from  a  practice 
shaped  more  from  allegiance  to  dogma  than  a  foundation  in 
science. Once begun, the assumption of absolute certainty as the 
only  possible  conclusion  has  been  maintained  by  a  system of 
societal  indoctrination,  not  reason,  and  has  achieved  such 
ritualistic  sanctity  that  even  mild  suggestions  that  its  premise 
should  be  re-examined  are  instantly  regarded  as  acts  of 
blasphemy. Whatever this may be, it is not science.286
Such  statements,  coming  from  the  technique’s  own 
practitioners, would  seem  to  make  the  latent  print 
community a poor choice for a practitioner community that 
is permitted to “self-validate” its own claims and exclude 
outsiders from the assessment of these claims. In sum, the 
Patterson  decision  is  unconvincing  because  the  court 
allowed admissibility to rest upon internal criticism instead 
of the external validation it demanded in  Canavan’s Case 
and allowed it to rest upon an extremely weak finding of 
commitment to robust internal criticism at that.
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285 . Id.
286 . David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521, 
528  (1996)  (describing  “shock”  and  “disbelief”  “within  the  forensic 
science community” at the results of the 1995 test).
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V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
In  2007 in  State  v.  Rose,  the  trial  court  in  a  capital 
murder trial ruled latent print evidence inadmissible under 
Maryland’s  Frye standard.287 The  ruling  marks  the  first 
wholesale  exclusion  of  latent  print  evidence  since  the 
earliest  challenge  in  1999  in  a  case  in  which  the 
government put on a case in response to an admissibility 
challenge.288 It is perhaps significant that the government’s 
case consisted solely of testimony from a practitioner. The 
government did not refer to any non-practitioner scientists 
who accept the claim that latent print individualization is 
valid.
This ruling raises interesting implications relevant to my 
discussion  here.  On  the  one  hand,  it  supports  my 
suggestion  that  latent  print  individualization  may  have 
survived its  Daubert  trials only to end up in the “Fryeing 
pan.” Further,  it  may contradict the conventional  wisdom 
that  Daubert  is  a  more  stringent  admissibility  threshold 
than Frye, especially for unpopular litigants with unpopular 
causes.289 The government’s  recent decision to refile  the 
case  in  federal  court  would  seem  to  support  this 
interpretation.290 If this tactic succeeds, it could lead to the 
rather  awkward  conclusion  that  expert  evidence  that 
cannot  satisfy  that  admissibility  requirements  of  the 
Maryland state courts is nonetheless welcome in the federal 
courts.  It,  moreover,  evokes  the  rather  surprising  notion 
that latent print evidence, once called “the very archetype 
of reliable expert testimony,”291 must forum shop in order to 
287
2
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get into evidence.
This article has focused on the neglected issue of the 
admissibility of latent print evidence in  Frye  jurisdictions. 
While this should be of importance to those wrestling with 
the  admissibility  of  latent  print  (and  other  forensic) 
evidence in those jurisdictions, the research reported here 
has implications that go beyond  Frye  jurisdictions and go 
beyond latent print evidence. The process of applying Frye 
to a single form of evidence has focused our attention on a 
number of important principles that should apply for  Frye 
analyses  of  any  evidence,  including  the  problems  with 
practitioner-only evidence, the importance of breadth, and 
the  challenges  of  constituting  a  relevant  scientific 
community  for  techniques  like  latent  print  identification 
whose  testimonial  claims  are  not  obviously  within  the 
domain of any particular scientific discipline. I will explore 
some of these further implications below.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR DAUBERT JURISDICTIONS
As I have noted above, I have turned my attention from 
Daubert to Frye only reluctantly, due to my strong belief, a 
belief shared by the overwhelming bulk of legal scholarship 
on  the  issue,  that  latent  print  individualization  evidence 
does not satisfy any reasonable application of  Daubert.292 
Nonetheless, the argument presented here for exclusion of 
latent print individualization evidence under the  Frye rule 
may  yet  be  of  some  relevance  for  consideration  of  the 
same evidence under the  Daubert standard.  Daubert still 
incorporates the general acceptance standard as one of the 
five factors designed to assess its “reliability” requirement. 
Thus,  the case presented here demonstrates  clearly  that 
latent print individualization evidence fails to satisfy at least 
one of the five  Daubert  factors, and, moreover, it fails to 
satisfy the factor that it has widely been assumed it would 
have easiest time satisfying.
2000).
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. Most evidence scholars who have addressed the issue agree that 
if  Daubert has any  meaning at  all,  it  must  preclude  the  admission of 
evidence that cannot demonstrate reliability.  See,  citations in note 241, 
supra.
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B. FRYE OR DAUBERT?
Although Daubert is frequently criticized, relatively few 
scholars,  principally Professor Schwartz, have gone so far 
as to argue that  Frye  is actually preferable.293 Should this 
case study change our view on this question?
I have previously argued that, in the understanding of 
the scientific basis of latent print individualization, Daubert 
has  had  a  transformative  effect.294 What  is  probably  the 
principal  flaw in  the  arguments  vouching  for  latent  print 
individualization—the  confusion  between  uniqueness  and 
accuracy  that  I  have  labeled  the  “fingerprint  examiner’s 
fallacy”—was not clearly enunciated until after the Daubert 
decision.295 It  would not be going too far to suggest that 
Daubert had a salutary effect on the understanding of the 
scientific  basis  underlying  latent  print  individualization 
merely by prompting a renewed look at the evidence after 
nearly a century of “general acceptance.”
In  addition,  of  course,  Daubert’s  focus  on  reliability 
sharpened  the  questions  that  were  asked  and  focused 
attention  of  the  crucial,  and  hitherto  neglected,  issue  of 
validity.  That  pilot  accuracy  studies  are  now  being 
undertaken, after a century of use of the technique in court, 
may  to  some  extent  be  ascribed  to  the  influence  of 
Daubert.296 Thus, the principal merit of  Daubert  has been 
symbolic in compelling various legal system actors to look 
more  closely  and  more  searchingly  at  many  types  of 
evidence that have long been taken for granted. But these 
searching inquiries have not necessarily generated rigorous 
admissibility rulings.
As  demonstrated  above,  Daubert’s celebrated 
vagueness has essentially allowed trial judges free rein to 
rule according to their instincts. One undervalued virtue of 
Frye is that, however vague it may be, it is less vague than 
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Daubert.  At  some  point,  the  existence  of  general 
acceptance  becomes  difficult  to  fudge,  especially  if  the 
principles  enunciated  above,  against  practitioner-only 
acceptance and for breadth, are adhered to. My principal 
reason for skepticism about Professor Schwartz’s embrace 
of  Frye  lay in my sense that it would be too receptive to 
closed communities, despite Professor Schwartz’s and some 
courts’  efforts  call  for  a  broad  interpretation  of  Frye.  It 
would appear, however, that applying  Frye’s  notion of the 
“relevant scientific community” is not necessarily any more 
difficult than applying Daubert’s notion of reliability.
This  discussion  would  seem to  support  the  emerging 
scholarly view that Frye and Daubert are not as different as 
scholars have previously assumed. Most evidence that fails 
Daubert  should probably fail  Frye  and vice versa. Indeed, 
this  case study shows that  even one of  Professor  Saks’s 
prime examples of a technique that satisfied Frye and failed 
Daubert297 actually fails  Frye too. The difficulties appear to 
lie not so much with which admissibility standard is chosen, 
but in operationalizing either standard in an even-handed 
manner.298
C. THE CLASH OF THE LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES
By  showing  the  lack  of  general  acceptance  of  the 
validity of latent print individualization, this articles raise a 
larger issue that transcends the narrow question of  legal 
admissibility:  the  disconnect  between  the  legal  and 
scientific  communities  as  concerns  the  validity  of  latent 
print  individualization.  The  evidence  assembled  above 
clearly  demonstrates  that  members  of  the  scientific 
community do not accept that the validity of  latent print 
individualization  has  been  established.  In  the  course  of 
demonstrating  that  latent  print  individualization  lacks 
general acceptance, this article has demonstrated the more 
important fact that only with difficulty can the government 
produce  any  non-practitioner  scientists  who  accept  the 
297
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claim that  latent  print  individualization  is  valid.  And yet, 
paradoxically,  few  courts  have  acknowledged  this 
deficiency,  and those that  have have tended to  deem it 
irrelevant  to  admissibility.299 Most  courts  have  tended  to 
uphold the admissibility of latent print individualization with 
ringing pronouncements about its validity. As I have noted 
elsewhere, these pronouncements have come to stand in 
for  scientific  validation  when  proponents  of  latent  print 
individualization  are called upon to  justify  their  claims.300 
Indeed,  courts  have  essentially  become  the  “relevant 
scientific community” for latent print evidence, a fact they 
sometimes  inadvertently  acknowledge when they  discuss 
“general acceptance” in the “judicial communit[y]” as if it 
were  something  conferred  by  courts  themselves,  rather 
than  by  an  external  expert  community.301 What  might 
“acceptance”  in  the  “judicial  communit[y]”  mean,  other 
than  following  precedent?  Such  reasoning  turns  a  Frye 
analysis into an exercise in following legal precedent, rather 
than the deference to an external expert community that 
stands at the heart of  Frye.302 Moreover, courts’ upholding 
of  the admissibility  of  latent  print  evidence has  required 
them  to  essentially  deem  irrelevant  the  views  of  the 
scientific community.
It  is  difficult  to  think  of  comparable  examples  of 
scientific  issues  upon  which  the  legal  and  scientific 
communities  stand  in  such  stark  and  dramatic 
disagreement. Will courts continue to hold out against the 
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view  of  the  scientific  community?  Will  the  scientific 
community become more aggressively interventionist? The 
recent  formation  of  a  panel  on  forensic  science  by  the 
National  Academies,  the  most  prestigious  and  credible 
scientific  organization  in  the  United  States,  raises  the 
possibility of a more forceful intervention on behalf of the 
scientific community.303 But whether and to what extent the 
panel will directly address the issue of validity remains to 
be seen.
***
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